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ADVERTISING AND MARKETING ON CABLE




The 1980's may be remembered as the decade of cable television. From
humble beginnings as a method for improving the broadcast television re-
ception for people in rural or mountainous areas,' cable television now
brings multiple channels of original programming into over fourteen mil-
lion homes across the country. With the current penetration level ap-
proaching 25% of homes with television, industry analysts are predicting
that 50-60% of the homes in the United States will be wired for cable tele-
vision by the end of the decade.2 As the coverage of cable spreads, with a
corresponding decline in broadcast network television's share of the audi-
ence,3 the advertising community is becoming increasingly interested in
exploring the potential of cable television as a distinct marketing medium.
Government agencies traditionally concerned with communications and
advertising, such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are taking a "hands-off' approach
to this new medium. Moreover, no federal intervention is likely, absent an
* Assistant for Special Projects for the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection from February 1978 to January 1980. Currently serving in the Bureau's
Division of Advertising Practice. B.A., Cornell University, 1971; J.D., New York Univer-
sity, 1974. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commissioner.
** Eric Engel expects to receive a J.D. from George Washington University's National
Law Center in 1982. He received a B.A. with Honors in Communication Studies from the
University of California, Los Angeles, in 1979.
1. Indeed, cable television was originally referred to generically as community antenna
television, or CATV, because the cable system would set up a large antenna on a hilltop or
other location having good reception in order to pick up signals from broadcast stations and
redistribute them over cable wires to paying subscribers. See FCC INFORMATION BULL. No.
18, Cable Television I (Oct. 1980).
2. O&M Projects Cable Reaching 60% in '90, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 15, 1980, at 56,
col. 4.
3. J Walter T hompson's Projections For The Future Of Cable & Commercial TV, ME-
DIA INDUSTRY NEws, Nov. 5, 1980, at 4, predicting a decline in share in prime time network
television audience levels from the current 90% to 85% in 1984-85, and 75% in 1989-90.
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established record of actual injury to the public interest.4 Yet must a scan-
dal arise for the creaky wheels of the federal bureaucracy to fashion a
response to assure that the "wired nation" will flourish as an honest and
open marketplace? By learning from history and planning ahead for com-
ing technological developments, industry, government, and the public can
work together to assist the cable medium in becoming an avenue for accu-
rate consumer information without the necessity for heavy-handed
regulation.
In Part I of this article, the reality of cable television as an advertising
and marketing medium is explored. Advertiser-supported, satellite-distrib-
uted cable programming networks already are offering their wares nation-
wide. Commercials in new formats, such as talk shows or feature films and
electronic push-button purchasing from two-way cable television video
catalogues, may be introduced soon.
Part II contains an overview of the federal framework for advertising
and marketing in the traditional media. In a series of rulings, the FCC has
established that broadcasters are responsible for the accuracy of the com-
mercials they disseminate.' This background has assisted the FTC in car-
rying out its mandate to police deceptive advertising.6 By contrast, the
FCC has not imposed similar duties on cablecasters for jurisdictional as
well as other reasons. 7 The FTC has also placed some consumer safe-
guards on direct marketing by conventional means, such as door-to-door
and mail-order sales, but has not extended them to newer forms of elec-
tronic selling.'
In Part III, the industry's efforts to provide a private security force to
scrutinize advertising are examined, with a particular emphasis on self-
regulation in the broadcasting industry. These private efforts appear to
have had a positive effect on the integrity of broadcast television commer-
cials. The initial efforts of the cable industry in this direction appear prom-
ising but need more development.
Finally, in Part IV, the possibility of raising, during the local franchising
4. While there is no explicit statutory requirement that consumer injury be shown
before the FTC will act, as a matter of policy, the agency generally awaits evidence of harm
before intervening in the marketplace. See FTC, Trade Regulation Rule for the Prevention
of Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices in the Sale of Cigarettes, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8354-55
(1964), where the Commission specified that "substantive injury to consumers" is one of
three factors determining whether a practice could be considered "unfair" under § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1958).
5. See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 45.
7. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
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(or licensing) process, the issue of the cablecaster's responsibility for the
commercials it disseminates is discussed. Unlike broadcast television sta-
tions, which are licensed by the FCC,9 cable television systems receive
franchises from local governments. The effect of the first amendment's free
press guarantee on a franchise provision concerning advertising and mar-
keting is analyzed. While not diminishing the importance of this consider-
ation, the authors conclude that it would be constitutional for a cable
franchisee to be required to assume responsibility for advertising, based
both on the cable operator's position as a locally-licensed business and the
constitutionally unprotected status of deceptive commercial speech.
In the final analysis, however, it is likely that pressures from local
franchising authorities will lead to the development of better self-policing
mechanisms for cable television, to the benefit of both the public and the
cable industry. Given the sheer number and diversity of local franchising
agreements and the rapid pace with which the available franchises are be-
ing awarded, it is doubtful that local regulation by itself will be effective.
By raising these consumer protection issues during the franchise negotia-
tion process, local citizens can work with the cable industry to create a
responsible, yet flexible, mechanism to protect cable viewers from decep-
tive advertising and abusive marketing schemes.
I. ADVERTISING AND MARKETING ON CABLE TELEVISION: CURRENT
STATE OF THE ART AND FUTURE PROJECTIONS
As is rapidly becoming common knowledge, the principal advantage of
cable over broadcast television is channel capacity. While only seven VHF
broadcast channels can coexist in any one community, a single coaxial
cable (about a finger's thickness) currently can deliver up to fifty-two dis-
crete channels.'0 Furthermore, any number of cables can be installed at
once, and major "builds" (cable installations) now typically employ at
least two cables. Another advantage is cable's unique interactive capacity
which allows the viewer to "talk back" to his or her television set.
Considering the competitive positions of cable and broadcast television,
it is ironic that cable began as an ally of the broadcast industry." Cable
9. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
10. J. STEARNS, A SHORT COURSE IN CABLE 8 (6th ed. 1981). The number of channels
that can be squeezed onto a single cable is expanding almost as rapidly as cable itself. While
engineers widely debated the feasibility of 400 mhz technology (capable of delivering 50 to
54 channels) in 1980, 400 mhz technology is now considered commonplace and Magnavox
has introduced 440 mhz equipment which it claims can deliver 64 channels on a single cable.
NCTA "81: Hottest Ticket in Mediavllle, BROADCASTING, June 8, 1981, at 44.
11. J. STEARNS, supra note 10, at 6.
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television originated in the late 1940's and early 1950's in the hills of rural
America as a device to improve reception of over-the-air signals from
broadcast television stations. 2 A fee was charged for this retransmission
service, but the programming and commercial advertising was the same as
that on "free" television. Cable television emerged as a separate medium
in the mid-1970's when satellite transmission spurred the development of
premium, commercial-free "pay cable" services, such as Time, Inc.'s
"Home Box Office."'13 Viewers proved willing to pay a subscription fee to
see recent and uninterrupted movies at home, a distinct advantage of cable
over broadcast television.
In the past few years, however, cable networks have begun to offer spe-
cial interest programming, partially supported by advertisements. Ted
Turner's Cable News Network, for instance, delivers a twenty-four-hour
news service as part of the basic cable package offered by many cable oper-
ators around the country. ' 4 This service is not available on broadcast tele-
vision, but like broadcast programs, it is intended to be advertiser-
supported. Similarly, cable programmers appealing to special interest
viewers, such as sports fans,15 women,' 6 children, ' 7 Blacks,18 Hispanics,' 9
12. Id
13. Barrington, Pay TV Now a Staple on the Cable 'Menu", in 2 THE CABLE/BROAD-
BAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK 1980-1981, at 135-36, 143 (M. Hollowell ed. 1980).
14. Huey, Future of All-News Network Seems Bright, But Crucial Meeting With Admen
Looms, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1981, at 19, col. 4. The network is reaching approximately three
million cable homes and has attracted at least 50 advertisers. Can Ted Turner's Cable News
Hang In?, Bus. WK., Nov. 3, 1980, at 91. One of the nation's largest advertisers, Bristol-
Myers, has entered into a 10-year, $25 million contract to sponsor the science and health
portions of the infant cable news service. Bronson, As Marketing Tool of Great Potential
Advertisers Begin to Look at Cable TV, Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1979, at 11, col. 1.
15. The Entertainment & Sports Programming Network (ESPN), which delivers sports
programs to six million cable homes, recently announced a $25 million, five-year advertising
contract with Anheuser-Busch, the well-known beer manufacturer. AB Pours $25 Million
into ESPN Contract, Advertising Age, Nov. 3, 1980, at 4, col. 1. ESPN's president estimated
that 70 advertisers would purchase approximately $7 million worth of commercial time from
this sports-oriented network in 1980. Id
16. USA Network announced that Bristol-Myers, maker of health and beauty aids, will
sponsor a two-hour daily women's show called "Alive and Well." USA Network, Press Re-
lease, Bristol-Myers, USA Network Sign Historic Cable Agreement (Feb. 18, 1981).
17. USA Network's children's show, "Calliope," has been opened up for commercials
deemed "compatible with the entertainment." Christopher, Alter to Fill the First CTVB Pres-
idency, Advertising Age, Mar. 2, 1981, at 58, col. 1.
18. Rosenthal, Cable Advertising Growth Comes In Varied Forms, TELEVISION/RADIO
AGE, May 19, 1980, at 39.
19. Hispanic TVis Beaming in on the Big Time, Bus. WK., Mar. 23, 1981, at 122. The
SIN Spanish Television Network, distributed by satellite to 79 cable systems, expected to
earn $30 million in advertising in 1981. Id
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theater buffs,2" and rock music fans,2 have announced plans to accept
commercials. In fact, of the thirty satellite-distributed cable programming
networks announced to date, fully one-half accept advertising.22 In addi-
tion to the satellite services, many cable systems sell advertising on their
own channels, using regional "interconnects" to reach larger audiences.23
The National Cable Television Association, the industry's trade associa-
tion, is optimistic about the future of commercial support for cable, pre-
dicting a tenfold increase in cable advertising revenues, to $350 million, by
1985.24
A few cable systems can also boast of "shop-at-home," or direct market-
ing video services. Modem Satellite Network's "Home Shopping Show"
reaches 3.8 million households in forty-seven states.25 Advertisers can buy
nine-minute segments in the half-hour show to demonstrate their wares
and to tell viewers how to order.26 Times-Mirror Satellite Programming
Company has joined with Comp-U-Card of America, Inc. to offer a video
information and discount buying service to cable viewers,27 in which the
cable system would receive a percentage of the sales originating from its
subscribers. 28 The giant of mail-order catalogues, Sears, Roebuck, and
Company, is experimenting with the concept of a Video Catalogue Chan-
nel to be distributed by cable television.29
While cable television seems to be developing into an advertising-sup-
20. Rockefeller Center, CBS and ABC all plan to offer culture-oriented pay cable pro-
gramming, featuring paid advertisements. RCTV Joins Cable Derby, Advertising Age, Dec.
15, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
21. Warner-Amex has introduced MTV, a 24-hour rock music network with stereo
sound, to attract the elusive, but lucrative, under-35 audience. MTV has prompted inquiries
from every major advertising agency in the country. Coeyman, Cable TV Turns New Ground
in World of Commercials, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 16, 1981, at 11.
22. Programers Directory, BROADCASTING, Dec. 15, 1980, at 62-66.
23. A National Cable Television Association survey found that 750 of the 4,700 cable
systems in the United States accept advertising for their own channels. The Cable Rep Entre-
preneurs, MARKETING & MEDIA DECISIONS, Feb. 1981, at 72.
24. Execs Debate Cable Ads, Advertising Age, Nov. 24, 1980, at 68, col. 3 (quoting Tom
Wheeler, President of the National Cable Television Association). Gerald Hogan, general
sales manager for Turner Broadcasting, which offers both "superstation" WTBS Atlanta and
the Cable News Network to cable viewers, predicts $500 million in advertising revenues by
1985 for Turner cable operations alone. Lofty Ad Growth Claims Made by Turner, Advertis-
ing Age, Jan. 19, 1981, at 68, col. 1.
25. Curley, Formulafor a Hit Cable TVShow. Don't Interrupt the Commercials, Wall St.
J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
26. Higgins, Products Star on Cable TV's 'Home Shopping Show', Marketing News, Jan.
23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
27. The Computer as Retailer, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1981, at Dl, col. 3.
28. Shop at Home Via Cable and Satellite, BROADCASTING, Dec. 15, 1980, at 31.
29. Sears' Wish Book Enters New Video Era, Advertising Age, May 4, 1981, at 10.
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ported medium like its broadcasting counterpart, there appear to be im-
portant differences in form and substance looming on the horizon.3" First,
cable's multiple channel capacity has provided a vehicle for special interest
programming, offering advertisers a unique opportunity to "narrowcast,"
or carefully target recipients of their video messages. 31 This fragmentation
of the viewing audience may result in an increase in the total number of
television advertisements disseminated because different segments wil be
watching different commercials, rather than a mass audience watching the
same advertisement. While the individual viewer may not be seeing a
greater number of commercials, the total number of commercials may in-
crease. This trend could have a substantial impact on the workload of a
centralized law enforcement agency like the FTC,32 charged with monitor-
ing deceptive advertising.
Second, cable television's advertising rates are, and probably will con--
tinue to be, considerably lower than those of broadcast television.33 Com-
panies that cannot afford to pay for national broadcast commercial
minutes may be enthusiastic purchasers of cable television advertising.
34
Thus, new national television advertisers could emerge, but these new,
smaller advertisers may not be familiar with the general requirements that
their claims be truthful, nondeceptive, and have a reasonable basis in
fact.
35
30. At the Cable Television Administration and Marketing Society's First National
Conference on Cable Advertising, Robert Alter, first president of the Cable Television Ad-
vertising Bureau, stressed the uniqueness of the medium. Alter said that "[c]able is different.
It cannot be forced to fit any existing media mold," and that "[tihe possibilities for develop-
ing cable as an advertising medium are probably only limited by our imaginations." CTVB's
Alter Puts "Vive la Diference" Proposition before CTAM Ad Conference, BROADCASTING,
Mar. 9, 1981, at 33.
31. Address by John E. O'Toole, President of Foote, Cone & Belding Communications,
Inc., American Association of Advertising Agencies Western Region Meeting (Oct. 18,
1980). See Lambert, Exploring the Potential of Cable Advertising, BROADCASTING, Feb. 9,
1981, at 16, describing the use of ESPN, a cable sports network, to target successfully poten-
tial purchasers of sporting goods store franchises; Poe, Narrowcasting, ACROSS THE BOARD,
June 1981, at 6.
32. Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
33. Kathryn Creech, Senior Vice President of the National Cable Television Associa-
tion, has pointed out that the relatively expensive rates of other media is the most important
reason for the rise of cable advertising. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 40.
34. See Burgeoning Rolefor Cable Sponsors, Advertising Age, Mar. 2, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
Cable "superstation" WTBS Atlanta sells prime-time 30-second spots for $1,100 to $1,800
each, while CBS, ABC, and NBC ask $50,000 to $150,000 for similar time slots. Cable TV
Pitching Big-Spending Advertisers, Advertising Age, May 5, 1980, at 72, col. 1.
35. A series of FTC cases has held that it is unfair and deceptive for advertisers to make
a claim without having substantiation or a reasonable basis in fact before they disseminate
the claim. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 543-44 (1973), modi/ed, 85 F.T.C. 391
[Vol. 31:227
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Third, unlike broadcast television, which is governed by an industry
code restricting the number of commercial minutes per hour of program-
ming, 36 cable television can offer advertisers more flexible time frames for
delivering their messages. In contrast to the thirty-second standard that has
evolved in broadcast television, at least one of the new cultural cable pro-
gramming networks has announced its intention to make time available
for two-minute, institutional messages.37 The possibilities of program-
length commercials (referred to as "informercials") and advertiser-pro-
duced programming for cable have also been raised. An example of the
former occurred on Warner-Amex's QUBE cable system in Columbus,
Ohio, when a representative of a local bookstore appeared on "Columbus
Alive," a public affairs talk show, to discuss the relative merits of
hardcover and paperback books. Four books mentioned during the seg-
ment were offered for sale to viewers by the sponsoring bookstore, but at
no time was the eight-minute interview identified for what it was-a paid
commercial.38
Cable systems seem to be suffering from a shortage of programming at
present, and it may be that the advertisers themselves will fill that gap with
sponsor-produced programs.39 In this respect, cable resembles the early
stages of program development in broadcast television, when advertisers
themselves produced the shows that were to be the vehicles for their com-
mercial messages.' While there is nothing inherently deceptive about ad-
(1975); In re Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 61-62 (1972); Firestone Tire & Rubber, Inc., 81 F.T.C.
398, 427-28 (1972), aj'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
36. The National Association of Broadcasters' Television Code limits the amount of
nonprogram material to 9 minutes and 30 seconds per hour during prime time and chil-
dren's programming and to 16 minutes per hour at all other times. NATIONAL Ass'N OF
BROADCASTERS, THE TELEVISION CODE 19-20 (21st ed. Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NAB
TELEVISION CODE). Nonprogram material includes billboards, commercials, and promo-
tional announcements. Id § XIV, para. 1, at 18 (Advertising Standards).
37. Herb Granath, head of ABC Video Enterprises, has stated that two-minute com-
mercials may be introduced on ABC's Alpha culture network. RCTV joins Cable Derby,
Advertising Age, Dec. 15, 1980, at 1, col. 1. Irving Kahn, Chairman and President of Broad-
band Communications, has noted that the future of the cable industry "lies not in the 30-
second spot but in our extraordinary capacity to develop new means of selling." Kahn Flies a
Red Flag, Donnelly a Green One, BROADCASTING, Mar. 9, 1981, at 35.
38. The segment cost the Readmor Bookstores about $75. Wicklein, Wired City, U.S.A.,
THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 1979, at 35, 37. In New York City, a travel agency regularly leases a
half-hour slot from Manhattan Cable to air "The First Cable Club Travel Segment," a
travelogue promoting the agency's package tours. FTC STAFF, MEDIA POLICY SESSION:
TECHNOLOGY AND LEGAL CHANGE (Dec. 31, 1979), at 31 [hereinafter cited as FTC MEDIA
POLICY BOOK].
39. For example, Bristol-Myers sponsored and produced the program "Alive and
Well." See supra note 16.
40. See E. BARNOUW, THE SPONSOR 46-58 (1978). Herbert Granath, Vice President of
19821
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vertiser-produced programs, or even program-length advertisements, both
may raise a consumer protection pitfall because viewers may not be suffi-
ciently aware of the sponsored nature of the programming.
One of the more intriguing marketing opportunities that will distinguish
cable from broadcast television is the use of interactive, or "two-way,"
cable systems to provide instant "push-button" ordering of items offered
for sale by means of video catalogues. The most famous of the two-way
systems is QUBE, and most of the recent cable franchises awarded around
the country include a promise to offer a similar capability.4 Using the
system's interactive capacity, QUBE viewers of a bookstore informercial
were invited at the end of the segment to purchase one of the four books
offered by pressing an appropriate button on their home consoles.4" This
raises the issue whether consumers could be pressured by this new medium
into purchasing products that they would not have bought had they had
sufficient time for reflection. On the other hand, the marriage of computer-
ized data bases with interactive cable could turn the television set into a
product information library.43 Comparative price, quality, and warranty
information could enrich the purchase decision at minimal cost to the con-
sumer." But who would compile these listings and bear responsibility for
their accuracy remains to be seen.
Cable as a distinct advertising medium is beginning to come into its
own. The cable networks carry some commercials today and more are ex-
pected in the future. Yet cable advertising may differ from conventional
television advertising by offering longer formats, narrower audiences, the
presence of many new television advertisers, and two-way communication.
Given these distinctions, how will the traditional regulatory framework,
designed to protect consumers from deceptive advertising and abusive
marketing practices, apply? This subject is explored in the next section.
ABC Video Enterprises, has said, "We would like to see advertising agencies and their cli-
ents come into this together and possibly produce programs they would sponsor, much like
in the early days of television." Poe, supra note 31, at 10.
41. Cable TV- The Race to Plug In, Bus. WK., Dec. 8, 1980, at 61, 66.
42. Wicklein, supra note 38, at 37.
43. See generally Window on the World- the Home Information Revolution, Bus. WK.,
June 29, 1981, at 74.
44. Cf. Mitchell, New Communications Technology- The Prospectfor Marketers, ADVER-
TISING, Autumn 1980, at 4, describing the United Kingdom's Prestel system which uses spe-




II. THE FEDERAL FRAMEWORK FOR ADVERTISING AND MARKETING
REGULATION-WHERE DOES CABLE FIT?
The Federal Trade Commission is the major federal agency monitoring
advertisements for deceptive practices.45 Any advertiser disseminating a
deceptive commercial over broadcast or cable television is subject to FTC
action. However, fulfillment of the FTC's mandate with regard to advertis-
ing in the broadcast media has been aided substantially by a series of FCC
rulings that hold broadcasters responsible for the accuracy of the commer-
cials they air. Although it is apparent that cable television will also be an
advertising medium, the FCC has not applied similar consumer protection
measures to cable.
A. FCC Rulings Establishing Broadcaster Responsiblityfor Advertising
The Communications Act of 1934 gives the FCC authority to license
broadcasters to serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."
46
Television licenses may be granted for a maximum of five years, with re-
newal at the discretion of the FCC.47 Under this statutory scheme, the
FCC has issued a series of regulations, decisions, and rulings interpreting
broadcasters' duty to act in the public interest.48
As a general policy, the FCC has avoided content review of allegedly
deceptive advertising by referring complaints to the FTC. Indeed, the two
agencies have entered into an agreement which provides that the FTC will
exercise "primary jurisdiction over all matters regulating unfair or decep-
45. Since its inception in the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the Commission
has pursued deceptive advertising cases. Pub. L. No. 203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1976)). See, e.g., FTC v. Lasso Pictures Co., I F.T.C. 374, 378-79 (1919) (adver-
tisements for old movies reissued under new titles must reveal the secondhand nature of the
goods). Until the Act was amended in 1938, however, the FTC was limited to a theory that
false advertising was an "unfair method of competition." Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1934). The FTC's jurisdiction was expanded in 1938 to include unfair and
deceptive trade practices. Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (currently codified at
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976)). For an excellent, if now somewhat dated, overview of the law of
deceptive advertising, see Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1005 (1967). See also Pitofsky, Beyond Nader. Consumer Protection and the Regulation
of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977); Pridgen & Preston, Enhancing the Flow of
Information in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and Beyond at the
Federal Trade Commission, 14 GA. L. REV. 635 (1980). Many state laws also allow consum-
ers to sue individually if they have been injured by a false or deceptive advertisement. See
Leaffer & Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Pri-
vate Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 (1980).
46. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1976).
47. Id as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35,
95 Stat. 736 (1981).
48. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.99 (1980).
1982]
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tive advertising in all media, including the broadcast media."49 The agree-
ment goes on to stress, however, that the FCC "will continue to take into
account pertinent considerations in this area [false and misleading adver-
tising] in determining whether broadcast applications for license or re-
newal of license shall be granted or denied .... ""
This division of authority does not negate the foundation of FCC direc-
tives to broadcasters to the effect that they must:
assume responsibility for all material which is broadcast through
their facilities. This includes all programs and advertising mate-
rial which they present to the public. With respect to advertising
material the licensee has the additional responsibility to take all
reasonable measures to eliminate any false, misleading, or decep-
tive matter . . . This duty is personal to the licensee and may
not be delegated."'
The FCC has also charged the broadcast licensee with a continuing obliga-
tion "to take reasonable steps to satisfy himself as to the reliability and
reputation of prospective advertisers."52 While "every station must have a
program to protect the public in this area,"53 the FCC has conceded that
stations may turn to the National Association of Broadcasters' Code Au-
thority for advice and may also rely on the national broadcast networks'
own clearance procedures. 4 The extent of the individual station's clear-
ance program for advertising also "depend[s] upon the size and resources
of the station."55 These FCC rulings demonstrate the Commission's recog-
nition that local stations must be allowed to rely on the self-regulatory
49. FCC Public Notice 41503, [Current Service] RAD REG. (P & F) 11:402 (Apr. 27,
1972) (liaison agreement between FCC and FTC concerning false and misleading radio and
television advertising).
50. Id
51. Report and Statement of Policy, re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry,
July 29, 1960, 20 RAD. REG. (P & F) 1901, 1912-13 (1960) (discussing Report and Statement
of Policy at 20 Fed. Reg. 7291 (1960)). See also Lee, The Federal Communications Commis-
sion's Impact on Product Advertising, 46 BROOKLYN L. REV. 463, 484-85 (1980).
52. Alan F. Neckritz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807, 813 (1971).
53. Consumer's Ass'n of D.C., 32 F.C.C.2d 400, 407 (1971). The significance of the
network clearance procedure will be discussed in greater detail at infra notes 153-57 and
accompanying text.
54. Id
55. Id In 1971, the FCC rejected a petition to adopt as part of its rules a "Code of
Standards" for television advertising, reasoning that self-regulatory efforts by the broadcast-
ing and advertising industries, as well as the apparent renewed vigor of the FTC, precluded
the need for such a code. Adoption of Standards Designed to Eliminate Deceptive Advertis-
ing from Television (Petition of TUBE (Termination of Unfair Broadcasting Excesses)), 32
F.C.C.2d 360, 373 (1971).
[Vol. 31:227
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mechanisms of their network or their trade association to fulfill their re-
sponsibility to eliminate deceptive commercials.
FCC licensees are required to take into account FTC rulings on particu-
lar commercial messages. If the FTC has issued a final judgment that a
particular advertisement is deceptive, the FCC has held that its continued
broadcast "would raise serious questions as to whether such stations are
operating in the public interest."56 The FCC has cautioned, however, that:
licensees should not rely solely on the action or inaction of the
Federal Trade Commission, nor should they suspend their own
continuing efforts in determining the suitability of advertising
material to be broadcast over their facilities. Thus, advertising
similar to that found to have been deceptive should raise ques-
tions on the part of broadcast stations as to the propriety of such
material.
57
To assist broadcasters in screening for deceptive commercial material,
the FTC, in cooperation with the FCC, began sending broadcasters a pub-
lication called "Advertising Alert."5" This bulletin provided notice of the
advertisements subject to corrective action by the FTC and also discussed
particular problem areas to "familiarize licensees with various deceptive
practices so that they will be able to recognize them and take appropriate
steps to protect the public against them."59 Thus, while the FCC has never
revoked a broadcast license because the station disseminated misleading
advertisements, a series of FCC directives has established that both adver-
tisers and broadcasters have a legal duty to prevent the dissemination of
false or misleading commercial messages.6'
56. FCC, Public Notice 41503, [Current Service] RAD. REG. (P & F) 11:401 (Feb. 21,
1957). The FCC later elaborated this point when it stated:
Should it come to [the FCC's] attention that a licensee has broadcast advertising
which is known to have been the subject of a final Order by the FTC, serious
question would be raised as to the adequacy of the measures instituted and carried
out by the licensee in the fulfillment of his responsibility, and as to his operation in
the public interest.
FCC, Public Notice 11836, [Current Service] RAD. REG. (P & F) 11:402 (Nov. 7, 1961).
57. FCC, Public Notice 41503, [Current Service] RAD. REG. (P & F) 11:401 (Feb. 21,
1957).
58. FCC, Public Notice 11836, [Current Service] RAD. REG. (P & F) 11:402 (Nov. 7,
1961) (announcing first issue of the FTC's "Advertising Alert").
59. Id.
60. There are no legal impediments to carrying out this obligation. The courts have
clearly ruled that a broadcaster may refuse to sell time for advertisements it finds objectiona-
ble for any reason (with limited exceptions necessary to effectuate the fairness doctrine and
to prevent antitrust violations). See Mclntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d
597, 601 (3d Cir. 1945). See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973).
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The Communications Act itself specifically requires that the sponsors of
all paid broadcast material be clearly disclosed.6 An FCC regulation pro-
vides that a single announcement of the sponsor's corporate or trade name,
or the name of the sponsor's product, is sufficient provided the product
name clearly indicates sponsorship of the message.62 However, the issue of
repeated sponsor identification for longer advertisements has not come up
in the broadcast context because the FCC effectively prohibits program-
length commercials.63 "Teaser" broadcasts (short announcements not
identifying the advertiser or product, which are to be revealed in subse-
quent advertisements) are also prohibited under the sponsor identification
rule.' "Subliminal" advertisements, in which a message is transmitted at
levels below the viewing audience's threshold of sensation or awareness,
would by definition constitute an evasion of the sponsor identification re-
quirement. The FCC has specifically prohibited this technique for all
broadcast material, whether commercial or not.65
The FCC has also required broadcasters to take special precautions to
assure the adequate separation of program content and commercial
messages on children's programs.66 For instance, a program host or other
personality appearing in the program may not promote products on the
same children's show on which he or she appears. 67 The FCC has empha-
sized that, in addition to strictly enforcing sponsor identification of com-
mercial material broadcast during children's programs, it also expects
licensees to exercise a higher than average level of care in preventing the
broadcast of false, misleading, or deceptive commercials on children's
61. 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (1976).
62. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(0 (1980).
63. Public Notice Concerning the Applicability of Commission Policies on Program-
Length Commercials, 44 F.C.C.2d 985 (1974). The FCC is apparently more concerned with
logging commercials as programs than with the potential for deception and has stated that
"[t]he primary test is whether the purportedly non-commercial segment is so interwoven
with, and in essence auxiliary to, the sponsor's advertising (if in fact there is any formal
advertising) to the point that the entire program constitutes a single commercial promotion
for the sponsor's products or services." Id at 986 (footnote omitted). See also KCOP-TV,
Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 149 (1970).
64. 40 Fed. Reg. 41935, 41939 (1975) (illustration (F)(32)) (codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1212 (1980) without the illustration).
65. Public Notice Concerning the Broadcast of Information by Means of "Subliminal
Perception" Techniques, 44 F.C.C.2d 1016 (1974).
66. Petition of Action for Children's Television (ACT) for Rulemaking Looking To-
ward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming
and the Establishment of a Weekly 14-Hour Quota of Children's Television Programs, 50
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974).
67. Id at 16.
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shows.68
The only other major FCC initiative regarding broadcast advertising
concerned the question whether commercial announcements could be sub-
ject to the fairness doctrine,69 which would require broadcasters to provide
a reasonable amount of air time to persons holding views opposed to those
expressed implicitly or explicitly in the advertisement. In 1967, the FCC
found that cigarette advertisements were inherently statements of a point
of view in the public controversy over the safety of smoking, and, there-
fore, broadcasters of cigarette commercials had to make time available to
opponents of smoking.7° The FCC ruling led to an inundation of demands
by environmentalists and others for broadcast time to respond to automo-
bile, public utility, and similar ads.7 The ill-fated experiment ended when
the FCC announced that its "cigarette rule" was erroneously based.72 Cur-
rently, the rule is that commercial advertising is not a statement on a con-
troversial issue triggering fairness doctrine obligations as long as the
advertisement is restricted to extolling the virtues of the product and takes
no explicit position on matters of public controversy.73
B. FCC Regulation of Cable Television
In contrast to the precedent of broadcaster responsibility for advertising,
the FCC has not placed any obligations on cable systems for the commer-
cials they disseminate, with the single exception of the sponsor identifica-
tion requirement.74 FCC regulation of cable television has waxed and
waned because the FCC's jurisdiction is indirect. The Communications
Act gives the FCC authority over broadcasters and common carriers but
68. See id at 18.
69. Under the FCC's fairness doctrine, licensees have a responsibility to devote a rea-
sonable amount of programming time to controversial issues of public importance and to
offer a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. The doctrine
was incorporated into the Communications Act by the 1959 amendments, Act of Sept. 14,
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1976)), and upheld by
the Supreme Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
70. WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967).
71. E.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971), holding that the
FCC, having applied the fairness doctrine to cigarette commercials, could not refuse to ap-
ply the doctrine to automobile and gasoline commercials. See generally Note, Fairness Doc-
trine." Television as a Marketplace of Ideas, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1222, 1243-49 (1970);
Comment, Problems in the Application of the Fairness Doctrine to Commercial Advertise-
ments, 23 VILL. L. REV. 340 (1978).
72. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest
Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 26 (1974).
73. See id at 25-26.
74. 47 C.F.R. § 76.221 (1980).
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does not mention the cable medium.75 FCC regulation of cable television
has been approved only to the extent that such regulation is reasonably
ancillary to the effective enforcement of broadcast television regulation.76
In addition, the FCC does not license cable systems, as it does broadcast
stations. Generally, states or municipalities grant cable franchises, and the
franchise applicant need only file a pro forma technical document ("signal
registration") with the FCC.7 7
Under the "reasonably ancillary" rubric, the FCC issued a series of reg-
ulations that, among other things, required larger cable systems to main-
tain a minimum potential capacity of twenty channels78 and to designate
one or more channels for access by the public and leasing programmers,
on a first-come, nondiscriminatory basis, and by local educational and
governmental authorities.79 The Supreme Court refused to sustain these
regulations, however, because "[tihe access rules plainly impose common-
carrier obligations on cable operators," in violation of the Communica-
tions Act.8" The FCC had earlier dropped its requirement that cable sys-
75. The FCC determined early on that cable television operators were not broadcasters
under subchapter III of the Communications Act because they did not use the airwaves to
transmit signals. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958).
76. In the 1960's, the FCC sought to restrict the operation of cable television systems on
the theory that their importation of distant signals into a local broadcast television market
would harm the local broadcast licensee and would not be in the public interest. Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962); Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To
Adopt Rules and Regulations To Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio
Service for Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Sys-
tems, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). The Supreme Court later affirmed the FCC's limited authority
over cable, stating that "the authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted
to that reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various re-
sponsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). Under the same theory, the Court later upheld FCC
regulations requiring cable systems with 3,500 or more subscribers to originate programming
(as opposed to simply retransmitting broadcast signals) and to make facilities available for
local production. United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649
(1972) (upholding Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regu-
lations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems, codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 74.111 l(a) (1971)). The regulation was first proposed in Inquiry Into the Development of
Communications Technology and Services to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking
and/or Legislative Proposals, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
77. 47 C.F.R. § 76.12 (1980).
78. 47 C.F.R. § 76.251 (1972) (systems with 3,500 or more subscribers had to build facil-
ities capable of handling at least 20 channels).
79. Id (governmental and educational users were not to be charged for the use of the
facilities; subject to an exception for production costs for live studio presentations exceeding
five minutes, public users were not to be charged for use of the facilities).
80. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (foot-
note omitted). Section 3(h) of the Communications Act prohibits broadcasters from being
treated as common carriers, Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, § 3(h), 48 Stat.
[Vol. 31:227
Advertising on Cable Television
tems originate some programming (as opposed to simply retransmitting
broadcast signals),8 but still applies the fairness doctrine and certain other
restrictions to any programming that is originated voluntarily by a cable
system.82 The only advertising restriction the FCC currently applies to
such "origination cablecasting" (including cable network programming
distributed by satellite) is sponsor identification, as mentioned above.83
The issue of how to comply with this mandate in the context of longer-
format "informercials" has not yet been addressed.
The FCC's relationship with cable television has come full circle in the
past two decades. Its original approach was to restrict the expansion of
cable in order to maintain the viability of broadcast television, a free serv-
ice to the public. Subsequently, the FCC saw the cable medium as an op-
portunity to provide access to television for previously excluded groups
such as local community groups and educational interests. With the rever-
sal of the access rules, however, the FCC has taken a pronounced deregu-
latory approach to the cable industry.
C FTC Regulations and Federal Statutes Affecting Direct Marketing
Cable television, due to its many channels, special interest program-
ming, and interactive (two-way) capability, is a promising medium, not
only for conventional types of advertising, but also for direct marketing
efforts. Direct marketing, or (from the consumer's perspective) in-home
shopping, encompasses any promotional plan through which a marketer
1066 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1976)), and the Court held this prohibition applicable
to cable operators as well. 440 U.S. at 705. The "first-come, first-served" aspect of the access
program led to the common carrier characterization by the Court. Id at 701-02. For an
excellent analysis of Midwest Video HI, as well as a good overview of the history of cable
regulation, see Note, Administrative Law-Communications Law-FCCAuthority Over Cable
Television--FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 1979 WIs. L. REV. 962.
81. Although the Supreme Court approved the origination requirements in Midwest
Video 1, 406 U.S. 649 (1972), the FCC later deleted the requirement, leaving the decision
whether to provide original programming to the local system operator. Amendment of Part
76, Subpart G, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Relative To Program Origina-
tion by Cable Television Systems; and Inquiry Into the Development of Cablecasting Serv-
ices To Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974).
82. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.205, .209, .213, .215 (1980), covering such topics as equal time
for political candidates and restrictions on obscenity and lotteries. Even these standards may
be lifted under new amendments to the Communications Act. See Cable Television Bureau,
FCC, Cable Television and the Political Broadcasting Laws: The 1980 Election Experience
and Proposals for Change, Report to Sen. Goldwater (Jan. 1981).
83. 47 C.F.R. § 76.221 (1980). The sponsor identification requirement has been waived
with respect to classified ads sponsored by individuals, provided that the cable system main-
tains a publicly-available list of the name, address, and phone number of each advertiser. 47
C.F.R. § 76.221(f) (1980).
19821
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 31:227
sells directly to the customer, without the intervention of a retail outlet.s" It
includes door-to-door sales, telephone solicitations, mail-order catalogues,
and television advertisements giving an address or telephone number
through which interested persons can place orders. With an interactive
cable system, consumers could order directly through the television set by
pressing in their credit card or debit card numbers, 5 thus bypassing the
extra step of calling or mailing in the order. While direct ordering by
means of cable television is farther down the road than cable as a conven-
tional advertising medium, it is nonetheless instructive to examine the cur-
rent regulatory framework for direct marketing in non-cable media, and to
analyze its applicability to cable direct marketing.
In 1972, the FTC promulgated a "cooling-off" rule for door-to-door
sales.8 6 In essence, the rule provides that any consumer who purchases an
item for twenty-five dollars or more from a sales representative at a place
other than the normal place of business of the seller has the right to cancel
the transaction within three business days of the sale. 7 The Commission
based its rule on a finding that personal selling had a record of consumer
abuses, such as deceptive door-openers and misrepresentations of price
and quality, and that it entailed the nuisance of a visit to the home by an
uninvited salesperson. 8 While several states89 and some FTC cases90 have
84. See generally B. STONE, SUCCESSFUL DIRECT-MARKETING METHODS (1979).
85. A "debit" card would allow the holder to initiate an "electronic fund transfer,"
defined as "any transfer of funds, other than a transaction originated by check, draft, or
similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic in-
strument, or computer or magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial
institution to debit or credit an account." 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(6) (Supp. IV 1980). Such a
transaction would be the rough equivalent of paying cash or writing a check, as opposed to a
credit transaction, which authorizes the debtor to defer payment. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(e) (1976).
See also infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
86. 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1973).
87. Id Similar cooling-off provisions had been adopted by a significant number of
states. See FTC, Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, Trade Regulations Rule and
Statement of Basis and Purpose, 37 Fed. Reg. 22,933, 22,935 n.6 (1972). Many states still
have such laws on the books. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1689.5-.13 (Deering Supp. 1979)
(three-day cooling-off, $25 minimum purchase, oral and written notice of right to cancel
must be given in the same language used in the sales presentation, seller has 10 days to
return down payment and 20 days to pick up cancelled goods); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 501.021.-035 (West Supp. 1981) (three-day cooling-off, $25 minimum purchase, seller
may keep part of down payment as cancellation fee); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 96-902 to -906
(Supp. 1979) (three-day cooling-off, credit sales only, seller may assess a cancellation fee and
pick up fee for cancelled goods even if buyer made no down payment); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-66-1 to -11 (Supp. 1980) (three-day cooling-off, credit sales only, cancellation fee, 40
days to pick up goods, excludes sales on buyer's initiative); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §§ 425-
431 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81) (same provisions as California Civil Code).
88. See FTC, Cooling-Off Period, supra note 87, at 22,937-40 for a summary of the
FTC rulemaking record on these points.
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applied cooling-off periods to telephone sales, for the most part, this con-
cept has been limited to in-person sales. Sales through television, either
broadcast or cable, are not covered.
In the field of unsolicited telephone selling, the abuses of misrepresent-
ing the purpose of the call (e.g., a research survey) and misrepresenting the
total price of the contract9 have been surfacing. The nuisance factor of
telephone solicitation has been widely discussed, 92 resulting in several leg-
islative proposals to give telephone subscribers the option of being taken
off telephone marketing lists.93 Computerized, automated dialing systems
that deliver prerecorded sales messages have been banned or restricted in
several states.94
The possibilities for computerized sales interactions via two-way cable
television are virtually limitless. A subscriber may respond to a "survey"
through his electronic mail system, only to be subjected to a personalized
sales pitch delivered from a computer bank of messages based on his an-
89. ALASKA STAT. § 45.02.350 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-914 to -924 (Supp. 1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.021.-035 (West Supp. 1981); IND. CODE §§ 244.5-2-501 to -505
(Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3538-:3541 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
9-A., §§ 3-501 to -057; tit. 32., §§ 4661-4668 (Supp. 1981-1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 445.111-.117 (1981-1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-501 to -508 (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 51-18-01 to -09 (Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 83.710-.750 (1979); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 423.201-.205 (West 1974). The three-day cooling-off provisions of Ohio's Home
Solicitation Sale Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.21-.28 (Page 1979), have been deemed
applicable to telephone sales by the Ohio Supreme Court. Brown v. Martinelli, 66 Ohio St.
2d 45, 419 N.E.2d 1081 (1981).
90. See Time, Inc., FTC File No. 781 0003 (Dec. 3, 1980); Budget Marketing, Inc., FTC
File No. 782 3015 (Oct. 10, 1980) (consent agreement); Hudson Pharmaceuticals Corp., FTC
Docket No. 2860 (July 2, 1980) (consent agreement); Neighborhood Periodical Club, Inc.,
FTC File No. 712 3119 (Jan. 25, 1980) (consent agreement); Hearst Corp., 82 F.T.C. 218
(1973) (consent agreement); Cowles Communications, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 218 (1972) (consent
agreement).
91. See, e.g., Neighborhood Periodical Club, Inc., FTC File No. 712 3119 (Jan. 25,
1980) (consent agreement).
92. See Luten, Give Me a Home Where No Salesmen Phone.: Telephone Solicitation and
the First Amendment, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129 (1979); Comment, Unsolicited Commer-
cial Telephone Calls and the First Amendment: .4 Constitutional Hangup, 11 PAC. L.J. 143
(1979).
93. See discussion of 1978 California legislative proposal in Comment, Unsolicited
Commercial Telephone Calls, supra note 92, at 159-60.
94. California, Florida, and Maryland ban all use of automatic dialing devices. CAL.
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2872 (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 365.165 (West Supp. 1981);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 55C (1980). Alaska and Wisconsin ban all "junk telephone calls"
without the prior written consent of the consumer. ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.472 (1980); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 134.72 (West Supp. 1981-1982). Virginia prohibits the use of devices that do
not disconnect when the consumer replaces the receiver. VA. CODE § 18.2-425.1 (Supp.
1981). In Illinois, automatic dialing systems may only be used with a live operator. Ill. Com.
Comm'n Docket 0087 (1978).
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swers to the survey. Overreaching sales techniques and potential invasions
of privacy could provoke a call for extension of consumer protection meas-
ures to interactive cable television. In addition to the constitutional issues
associated with attempts to restrict nondeceptive commercial speech, it is
unclear whether electronic sales would give rise to the same level of con-
sumer injury as door-to-door, in-person sales. Measures such as cooling-off
periods, subscriber option to be taken off call lists, and clear identification
of the purpose of the communication at its outset may have to be consid-
ered in the future but should be approached cautiously so as not to stifle
innovation in this new medium, which has the potential to provide a
wealth of valuable information to consumers.
Another issue in direct marketing, whether conventional or electronic, is
the amount of time the seller should take to send the ordered merchandise.
In 1975, the FTC issued a regulation (the Mail-Order Rule) which in es-
sence provided that sellers should ship merchandise ordered by mail to
buyers within the promised time period or within thirty days if no time*
had been specified. 95 If the seller is unable to send the goods within the
applicable time period, the buyer must be given the option to consent to a
delay for a specified time or to cancel the order and receive a prompt re-
fund.96 The FTC rulemaking record contains over 20,000 pages of con-
sumer complaints regarding mail order sales, with failure to ship prepaid
merchandise by far the most frequent complaint.97 Despite the enforce-
ment efforts of the FTC, the United States Postal Serviceas and the indus-
try trade association,99 late delivery and nondelivery remains a significant
consumer problem. 100
Despite an expected upsurge in direct sales by telephone' 0 and other
electronic media, including cable television, neither the FTC's Mail-Order
Rule nor the Postal Service statutes apply to transactions other than those
95. 16 C.F.R. § 435.1(a)(1) (1976).
96. Id at § 435.1(b)(1).
97. Mail Order Merchandise, Promulgation of Trade Regulation Rule, 40 Fed. Reg.
51,582 (1975).
98. The Postal Service has jurisdiction over mail-order problems involving criminal
fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), and misrepresentations of fact by the seller, 39 U.S.C. § 3005
(1976).
99. The Direct Mail/Marketing Association is a 3,400-member industry group that
helps resolve consumer mail-order problems. It currently receives 20,000 to 30,000 mail-
order complaints a year, most involving nondelivery. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S MAIL ORDER RULE NEEDS IMPROVED MONI-
TORING AND ENFORCEMENT 3 (Jan. 19, 1981).
100. Id at 2. See also Federal Study Advising Mail-Order Rule Reform, N.Y. Times, Jan.
26, 1981, § A, at 24, col. 5.
101. GAO Report, supra note 99, at 1.
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where the consumer orders by mail. 10 2 Thus, they would not apply to cable
television marketing efforts, unless the buyer uses the mails to order rather
than the telephone or the interactive feature of a cable system. Whether
late shipment protection should be extended to the electronic media re-
mains an unanswered question.
To the extent that consumers use electronic fund transfer (EFT)"°3
rather than credit to purchase items marketed on cable, some significant
consumer rights would be lost. The Fair Credit Billing Act allows credit
card customers to use the creditor's dispute resolution procedure. In turn,
it requires the creditor to withhold charges for goods or services which the
consumer did not accept or which were not shipped as agreed." Further-
more, under certain circumstances, the consumer can withhold payment
from the credit card issuer by asserting a claim or defense against the
merchant regarding the quality of the goods purchased.0 5 The Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, by contrast, was apparently aimed primarily at the
bank-depositor relationship and does not contain these marketing-ori-
ented, consumer protection measures."° An EFT purchase would operate
in essentially the same way a cash purchase does, since payment could not
be withheld if the goods were not sent or were defective.
Finally, it is unclear how consumers will obtain presale warranty infor-
mation for goods marketed directly on cable television. Congress passed
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act in 1975 with the stated goal of improv-
ing the adequacy of warranty information available to consumers, thereby
improving competition in the marketing of consumer goods.10 7 Under an
102. 16 C.F.R. § 435.1(a)(1) (1981) states that the FTC Mail-Order Rule is applicable to
"any order for the sale of merchandise to be ordered by the buyer through the mails." (em-
phasis added). The Postal Service Statute dealing with false representations (as opposed to
mail or wire fraud) requires that there be "a scheme or device for obtaining money or
property through the mail by means of false representations" in order to constitute a viola-
tion. 39 U.S.C. § 3005(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
103. Most development of EFT systems thus far has been in banking rather than in mar-
keting. If "home banking" and "home shopping" services develop simultaneously, it is likely
that the cable medium could become a major stimulus for the use of EFT. There may be a
regulatory stumbling block to this development, however, because paper receipts currently
must be made available at all EFT terminals. Electronic Fund Transfer Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693a(7), 1693d(a) (Supp. 11 1978). See generally Broadman, Electronic Fund
TransferAct: Is the Consumer Protected?, 13 U. OF S.F.L. REV. 245 (1979).
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666(a), (b)(3) (1976).
105. Id. § 1666i (transaction must exceed $50 and occur in the same state or within 100
miles of the cardholder's address).
106. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (Supp. 11 1978); 12 C.F.R. §§ 205-205.14
(1981). For a summary of the features and failings of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, see
Broadman, supra note 103, at 13.
107. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312a (1976)).
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FTC regulation implementing the Act, a written copy of the warranty (if
any is offered) on all consumer products priced over fifteen dollars must be
available in retail stores prior to any sale. '0 8 As for mail-order catalogues,
either the full text of the warranty must be reported, or the catalogue must
disclose that a free copy of the written warranty can be obtained on re-
quest. 10 9 Due to a rather broad definition of "mail-order,""' it appears
that telephone and interactive cable sales would be included. The capabil-
ity of interactive cable television to provide instant access to a central data
base would clearly benefit consumers in obtaining the warranty informa-
tion through the cable medium itself, rather than through the more cum-
bersome procedure of requesting the warranty by mail.
In marketing, as in advertising, a regulatory structure has been erected
to curb abuses in the traditional media; these safeguards, for the most part,
are not applicable to cable marketing. Yet federal regulation is unlikely
unless a record of consumer injury develops. If abuses in this new use of
cable television are to be prevented, the most likely stimulus at this time
would be either industry self-regulation or local franchising agreements.
Each of these possibilities is discussed in turn in the next two sections.
III. INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION OF ADVERTISING AND
MARKETING-PRECEDENTS FROM BROADCASTING AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR CABLE
Advertising and marketing in the broadcast media, particularly televi-
sion, is filtered through a series of self-regulatory standards and proce-
dures to assure its accuracy. The National Association of Broadcasters
(NAB) has developed a fairly detailed Television Code"'. and issues de-
tailed guidelines and Code interpretations as needed. 1 2 The NAB also
prescreens commercials in a few sensitive categories." 3 The three major
108. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (1981).
109. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(c)(2)(i) (1980).
110. The regulation defines "catalogue or mail-order sales" to include "any solicitation
for an order for a consumer product with a written warranty, which includes instructions for
ordering the product which does not require a personal visit to the seller's establishment."
Id
11. NAB TELEVISION CODE, supra note 36. Sections I through VIII are concerned with
program standards. Sections IX through XV deal with advertising standards.
112. See, e.g., NAB CODE AUTHORITY, CHILDREN'S TV ADVERTISING GUIDELINES (2d
ed. Apr. 1977).
113. The NAB Code Authority prescreens all broadcast commercials in the following
four areas: (1) children's toys, (2) children's premiums, (3) personal care products, and (4)
margarine and vegetable oil products involving health claims. LaBarbera, Analyzing and
Advancing the State of the Art of Advernising Self-Regulation, 9 J. OF ADVERTISING 27, 30
(1980).
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broadcast networks preview all commercials aired, subjecting them to an
internal audit under standards for accuracy and "taste.""' 4 The Associa-
tion of National Advertisers (ANA), the trade association of major na-
tional advertisers, and the American Association of Advertising Agencies
(4A's) created the National Advertising Division (NAD) of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus to review advertisements of questionable verac-
ity.'II This rather tightknit web appears to have helped prevent, at least on
national television, the dissemination of blatantly fraudulent advertising.
The cable industry, by contrast, is just beginning to explore the need for
self-regulation in this burgeoning new medium. The development of inter-
nal regulation in broadcast television and its potential applicability to
cable is examined next.
A. The NAB and the Television Code
The NAB had its origins in the radio industry, having had its first or-
ganizational meeting in 1923.116 After the creation of the Federal Radio
Commission (precursor to the FCC) in 1927,' ' 7 criticism of certain radio
industry practices, such as the playing of unidentified phonograph records
and, curiously, direct advertising (today called commercials), began to
mount."" In an attempt to forestall further government regulation, the
NAB Board of Directors approved the organization's first Code of Ethics
in 1928.119 This first effort was rather general, 120 but the following year,
the NAB revised the Code, with six out of the seven principles of conduct
addressing consumer deception and safety issues.
12 1
The Code provisions were more honored in the breach than otherwise
by most radio stations, however, leading the Federal Radio Commission to
threaten "proper legislation" (including the possibility of nationalizing the
industry) if the broadcasters did not eliminate "false, deceptive or exagger-
114. J. PRICE, THE BEST THING ON TV 127-28 (1978). For a discussion of CBS' screening
practices, see Consumers Ass'n of D.C., 32 F.C.C.2d 400, 401 (1971).
115. LaBarbera, The Shame of Magazine Advertising, 10 J. OF ADVERTISING 31, 36
(1981). The NAD reviews both broadcast and print advertisements.
116. D. Mackey, The National Association of Broadcasters-Its First Twenty Years, 8
(Aug. 1956) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in NAB Library) [hereinafter cited as Mackey].
117. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
118. Mackey, supra note 116, at 346.
119. Id
120. In his doctoral thesis on the history of the NAB, David Mackey said of the 1928
version of the Code: "It's obvious that in its efforts to keep everyone happy, the ethics com-
mittee came up with a Code which not only had no teeth, but very soft gums." Id at 350.
121. The full text of these six principles was:
SECOND. When the facilities of a broadcaster are used by others than the own-
er, the broadcaster shall ascertain the financial responsibility and character of such
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ated" advertising statements. 22 The FTC, on the other hand, proposed a
conference with the industry "for the purpose of cooperatively drafting
rules by which the industry could regulate itself and thus avoid the pitfalls
of fraudulent or misleading advertising."' 23 While the Radio Commission
ultimately concluded that government ownership was impractical and that
regulation of commercial advertising would impair the quality of pro-
gramming, 124 the Association of National Advertisers three years later
proposed a plan to eliminate undesirable advertising by "voluntary inter-
nal censorship" with "the hope of substituting 'self-regulation' of advertis-
ing for projected government regulation . . 125
From the beginning of commercial television, the radio Code of Ethics
was considered applicable to television broadcasters, but in 1950 the NAB
announced plans to develop a separate television code to deal with televi-
sion's visual aspects. 126 As was the case in the development of the radio
code, one of the likely motivations was to fend off government regulation,
a threat apparently believed to be possible but not imminent. 27 When
Senator William Benton introduced a Senate resolution calling for the cre-
client, that no dishonest fraudulent or dangerous person, firm or organization may
gain access to the Radio audience.
THIRD. Matter which is barred from the mails as fraudulent, deceptive or ob-
scene shall not be broadcast.
FOURTH. Every broadcaster shall exercise great caution in accepting any ad-
vertising matter regarding products or services which may be injurious to health.
FIFTH. No broadcaster shall permit the broadcasting of advertising statements
or claims which he knows or believes to be false, deceptive or grossly exaggerated.
SIXTH. Every broadcaster shall strictly follow the provisions of the Radio Act
of 1927 regarding the clear identification of sponsored or paid-for material.
SEVENTH. Care shall be taken to prevent the broadcasting of statements derog-
atory to other stations, to individuals, or to competing products or services, except
where the law specifically provides that the station has no right of censorship.
Excerpts from the 1929 Code, app. 2, reprinted in L. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO: A
REPORT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMMISSION
ON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1947).
122. Warning Issued on Blatant Advertising; Commission Proposes Self-Regulation to
Stave Off CongressionalAction, Upholds American System, BROADCASTING, Jan. 1, 1932, at
12. The Commission expressed concern about offensive programming as well as question-
able commercial material. 1d
123. US. Trade Body Head Lauds Radio Ethics, BROADCASTING, Mar. 15, 1932, at 5.
124. Radio Board Cold to Advertising Cut, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1932, at 12, col. 3.
125. ANA Plans to Bar False Advertising, Proposes Self-Regulation to Obviate Federal
Control, BROADCASTING, Jan. 15, 1935, at 26.
126. T V Standards; NAB to Set Up Code Unit, BROADCASTING, May 1, 1950, at 50.
127. An editorial in Telecasting (a subsection of BROADCASTING) noted:
It was probably inevitable at this stage of television development that there would
have occurred enough lapses in common sense and good taste in programming to
arouse a fear within the industry that unless formal corrective action were taken at
once, censorship was just around the corner.
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ation of an eleven-member National Citizens Advisory Board for Radio
and Television in 1951,128 however, a trade press editorial condemned the
proposal as an attempt at "regulation by lifted eyebrow."' 29 Suddenly, the
promulgation of a television code became a high priority for the National
Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters. 30 Before the end of
1951, the first television code was adopted. Broadcasting magazine noted
that the "stringent code" was approved by the industry "with the eyes of
Congress upon them."''I As passed, the Code sought to remind telecasters
that "they must be choosy in admitting advertisers to their facilities as well
as careful to require truth and consideration in commercial messages
,,132
The Television Code has undergone twenty revisions since its first adop-
tion, but the basic principles have remained constant. It acknowledges that
broadcasters are ultimately responsible for all material broadcast by their
stations, including advertising. 133 Broadcasters are advised to "refuse the
facilities of their stations to an advertiser where they have good reason to
doubt . . . the truth of the advertising representations."'' 34 As a general
rule with regard to advertising, the Code states:
great care [should] be exercised by the broadcaster to prevent the
presentation of false, misleading or deceptive advertising. While
it is entirely appropriate to present a product in a favorable light
and atmosphere, the presentation must not, by copy or demon-
stration, involve a material deception as to the characteristics,
performance or appearance of the product.'
35
More specific guidance on particular types of advertising is provided.
For instance, commercials directed primarily toward children must be
clearly separated from the program 136 and must not feature personalities
Television Code I--an Editorial, Telecasting, May 1, 1950 at 4 cited in BROADCASTING, May
1, 1950, at 50.
128. S.J. Res. 76, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 97 CONG. REc. 6117 (1951).
129. Bye Bye, Bill of Rights, BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1951, at 58.
130. In 1951, the NAB merged with the Television Broadcasters Association and
changed its name to the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters
(NARTB). The NARTB said that the Television Code would show the public that the in-
dustry "means business." T V Code Takes Shape, BROADCASTING, Oct. 8, 1951, at 71. The
organization reverted to the name NAB in 1958.
131. Stringent TV Code, BROADCASTING, Oct. 22, 1951, at 23.
132. Id
133. NAB TELEVISION CODE, supra note 36, at I (Preamble). The preamble goes on to
state that the responsibility is shared with television advertisers. d
134. Id § IX, para. I(B), at 11 (Advertising Standards).
135. Id § X, para. 1, at 15.
136. Id § IX, para. 6(B), at 13.
j
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or cartoon characters regularly appearing in the sponsored program. 37
"Bait and switch" advertising is specifically prohibited, 38 as are program-
length commercials. 39 Personal endorsements must be genuine and based
on personal experience."4 References to research, surveys, or tests must
not "create an impression of fact beyond that established by the work that
has been conducted."' 4' The use of an actor in a white coat (i.e., simulat-
ing a medical professional) to recommend a health product is not permit-
ted.' 42 Contests and premium offers should spell out all details and not
exaggerate the prizes to be won.'
43
The NAB Television Code, to which 67% of United States television
stations and the three national networks. subscribe,144 is administered by
the Television Code Authority. 45 This group issues a continual series of
"interpretations" of the Code for the guidance of subscribers. For instance,
although mail order merchandising is nowhere specifically mentioned in
the Television Code, the Code Authority has interpreted the general provi-
sions regarding the integrity and truthfulness of advertisers to advise that
"mail order advertising, because it exhorts the viewer to invest his money
in a product sight unseen, requires greater vigilance by the broadcaster
than is normally required."'"
The Code is enforced formally by control over the use of the "NAB
Television Seal of Good Practice,""14 7 and by the Code Authority's bi-
yearly monitoring of each television station. 4 s The NAB has rarely sus-
137. Id § IX, para. 6(E), at 13.
138. Id § IX, para. 14, at 14. Bait and switch involves "goods or services which the
advertiser has no intention of selling. . . offered merely to lure the customer into purchas-
ing higher-priced substitutes." Id
139. Id § IX, para. 15, at 15.
140. Id § IX, para. 6, at 15.
141. Id § X, para. 2, at 15.
142. Id § XI, para. 4(A), at 17.
143. Id §§ XII & XIII, at 17-18.
144. NAB, LEGAL GUIDE TO FCC BROADCAST RULES, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES, ch.
IV, at 2 (May 1977).
145. The NAB Code Authority employs a full time staff of 34 and has offices in New
York City, the District of Columbia, and Los Angeles. This group preclears about 3,000
advertisements per year. The Code Authority also has a medical and scientific panel which
provides free advisory service to NAB staff. Interview with Jerry Lansner and William
Schulte, NAB Code Authority Staff, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Lansner Interview].
146. Mail Order Adverring Requires Special Care in Ealuating Offer Before It i Aired,
NAB TV CODE NEWS, Dec. 1966, at 3.
147. See NAB TELEVISION CODE, supra note 36, § 111(4), at 25 ((Regulations and Proce-
dures). Section 111(4) states that authority to use the Seal may be revoked or suspended by a
vote of two-thirds of the Television Board of Directors.
148. NAB CODE AUTH., BROADCAST SELF-REoULATION: WORKING MANUAL (1976 in-
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pended a station's authority to use the Seal; 149 however, there may be
enough public awareness to make the threat of withdrawal a fairly effec-
tive deterrent. 5 Most of the policing appears to be accomplished through
advice and comment behind the scenes. Member stations can and fre-
quently do call the Code Authority for advice. 5' Advertising agencies
may also come in with questions in the course of preparing a campaign.
After a commercial is aired, advertisers may file complaints with the NAB
regarding the claims of their competitors. These questions can be negoti-
ated with the member stations who broadcast the commercials in ques-
tion.'5 2 Another major influence on compliance is the clearance procedure
for commercials employed by the broadcast networks; this procedure will
be discussed in the next section.
B. Broadcast Television Network Internal Review Procedure
While little has been formally documented about the rules and proce-
dures for network clearance of commercials, there can be no doubt that it
plays a pivotal role in maintaining the honesty of advertising shown on
national network television. The networks review every commercial before
it is aired, a total of approximately 50,000 per year.' 5 3 The networks are
prominent members of the NAB, each having a permanent seat on the
Board of Directors. The broadcast networks consider applicable NAB
Code standards when they preview advertisements. 54 Thus, many com-
sert) [hereinafter cited as BROADCAST SELF-REGULATION]; Lansner interview, supra note
145. During this review of the station's log books, certain types of commercials are generally
flagged for additional review. Id
149. One incident occurred in the early 1960's when 65 subscribers withdrew or were
ejected from subscription to the Code because of a dispute over advertising for a hemorrhoid
medicine. Nearly all subsequently rejoined the fold. BROADCAST SELF-REGULATION, supra
note 148, Commercial Clearance (1972 insert).
150. The NAB has pledged to publicize the Seal and its significance. NAB TELEVISION
CODE, supra note 36, § 111(2), at 25 (Regulations and Procedures). In 1967, the NAB com-
missioned a Roper survey of the public's awareness of the Seal and found that 54% of those
asked had seen the Seal before, and that most of those who had seen it were aware of the
basic provisions of the Code. Special Report: Research Shows Public Prefers Self-Regulation,
NAB TV CODE NEWS, April 1967, at 1. Only one-third believed the industry had imposed
the rules on itself, with most crediting the FCC or some other government agency. Id
151. Lansner interview, supra note 145.
152. Id
153. Id In 1971, the CBS Television Network Program Practices Department alone had
a staff of 34 in New York and Los Angeles. Advertisements are usually submitted in script or
storyboard form. All product claims must be substantiated, and the network staff, the adver-
tiser, and/or the advertising agency commonly discuss the substantiation or presentation of
a claim before it is accepted by the network. Consumers Ass'n of D.C., 32 F.C.C.2d 400, 401
(1971).
154. Lansner Interview, supra note 145.
J
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mercials containing potential Code violations are never broadcast, but are
modified or rejected at the network level. Indeed, other self-regulatory
bodies that deal with television advertising have been greatly assisted by
the network procedures.
5 -
Network clearance, which grew partially out of a desire to preserve the
licenses of affiliated stations, was formalized during the early 1970's.' 56
During this time, the three networks also began a practice, still continued
today, of forwarding the scripts or storyboards of all commercials aired to
the FTC's Advertising Monitoring Unit.' 57 Thus, the FTC is assisted in its
consumer protection mission by the network clearance procedures and by
having scripts of commercials made available for review.
C The National Advertising Division of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus
The National Advertising Division (NAD) and its appellate body, the
National Advertising Review Board (NARB), were sponsored in 1971 by
the major advertising associations (the ANA and the 4A's) under the aegis
of the Council of Better Business Bureaus. 158 The NAD does not adminis-
ter a code as such, but its stated goal is "to achieve and sustain high stan-
dards of truth and accuracy in national advertising."'
' 59
The NAD does not preview commercials but resolves complaints from
competitors and consumers. It also initiates almost half of its cases by
monitoring advertisements on radio and television and in magazines and
newspapers. 60 Cases that cannot be resolved by the NAD are reviewed by
the NARB, a court of appeals composed of ten five-member panels of rep-
155. NAB Code Authority staff confirmed that they would have to expand their opera-
tions greatly if the networks stopped clearing commercials. Id Similarly, Lorraine Reed,
Senior Vice President of the Council of Better Business Bureaus' National Advertising Divi-
sion (NAD), has said that while 53% of their cases are from the print media, only 32% are
from television. The network prescreening procedures, therefore, probably help keep mis-
leading advertisements from being aired. Interview with Lorraine Reed, New York, N.Y.
(Feb. 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Reed Interview].
156. Interview with Alfred Schneider, Vice President of Incorporation, American Broad-
casting Company, New York, N.Y. (Feb. 23, 1981).
157. Letters from Miles W. Kirkpatrick to American Broadcasting Co., Columbia Broad-
casting System, and National Broadcasting Co. (Mar. 22, 1971). Prior to 1971, the FTC
required submission of only periodic samples of network advertising scripts. FTC, How FTC
Monitoring System Operates, Advertising Alert No. 2 [Current Service] RAD. REG. (P & F)
11:402 (Feb 12, 1962).
158. LaBarbera, The Shame of Magazine Advertising, supra note 115, at 36.
159. LaBarbera, Advertising Self-Regulation, supra note 113, at 30. The NAD, however,
does distribute specific guidelines for children's advertising. NAD Reviews 1980 Accomplish-
ments, NEWS FROM NAD, Jan. 15, 1981, at 1.
160. Reed Interview, supra note 155.
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resentatives from advertisers, advertising agencies, and the public. 6 ,
While this system has been in existence for over eight years, only thirty-
five panel decisions regarding truth and accuracy in national advertising
have been rendered to date.'62 Referral to the FTC is considered the ulti-
mate sanction, but thus far this has not proven necessary. 63
The work of the NAD/NARB apparently has been very effective. For-
mer FTC Chairman (now Commissioner) Michael Pertschuk has praised
the group for having "skimmed the cream of deceptive ads, outrageous
frauds and misrepresentations. Thanks to you, the latter-day ancestor of
the silver tongue snake oil purveyor has been tongue-tied.' 64 Former
FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky, who was Director of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection at the time the NARB was created, has stated:
[T]he NARB is as successful an effort at self regulation as any we
have witnessed in the country. Many of the cases that might
otherwise vex federal enforcers are nipped through the self regu-
lation process, and policing now occurs inside advertising's house
and therefore without the inevitable friction of government regu-
lation of private activities.
61
D. Cable Advertising and the Future of Self-Regulation
The cable industry begins its emergence as an advertising vehicle at a
time when deregulation has become fashionable. Yet, self-regulation can
have a positive, prophylactic effect. Will this relatively young medium act
responsibly to ensure that cable television is not handicapped from the
start by unsubstantiated or misleading advertising banned by the more es-
tablished media? The signs thus far are encouraging, although more could
be done to bring cable up to the level of broadcast television in terms of
advertising self-regulation.
The National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the cable counter-
part to the NAB, has formed a committee to study advertising self-regula-
tion.' 66 The NAB Code appears to be the primary model, although the
161. Zanot, A Review of Eight Years of NARB Casework: Guidelines and Parameters of
Deceptive Advertising, 9 J. OF ADVERTISING 20 (1980).
162. Id
163. LaBarbera, Advertising Self-Regulation, supra note 113, at 3 1.
164. Address by Chairman Michael Pertschuk, FTC, Annual Meeting of the National
Advertising Review Board, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 8, 1978).
165. Address by Commissioner Robert Pitofsky, FTC, National Convention of the
American Advertising Federation, Washington, D.C. (June 12, 1979).
166. Statement by Kay Koplovitz, President of the USA Network, The Consumer and
Cable Television: A National Conference, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27, 1981). See also Can
Advertising Regulate Itself?, MARKETING & MEDIA DEcISIONS, July 1981, at 37.
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NCTA is taking a cautious approach."67 Some aspects of the NAB Code,
such as the limits on commercial minutes per hour, may not be deemed
appropriate for cable, which can offer advertisers greater flexibility due to
the large number of channels available. 6 ' In addition, absolute bans on
commercials for certain types of products (e.g., liquor and contracep-
tives)169 may not be needed in the cable medium, which has the technical
capacity to allow parents to prevent their children from having access to
"adult" channels. Indeed, any attempt to restrain the free flow of truthful
commercial speech on cable could be viewed as anticompetitive. 7 °
NCTA is not only looking back to the NAB Code, but is also reportedly
studying the self-regulatory code of a more futuristic and experimental
medium,' 7' the computerized information retrieval system called Prestel,
now operating in the United Kingdom. 172 Prestel is a "viewdata" or "vide-
otex" system, which in essence links the user's television set to a central
data bank via telephone lines (although the same effect could be achieved
directly through the coaxial cable used in cable television). Prestel gives
the user access to over 160 information providers, including Reuters, Brit-
ish Rail, FINTAL (a commercial publisher of financial information) and
American Express. 7' The system, developed by the British Postal System,
is operated as a common carrier. The information providers (not Prestel)
are solely responsible for the content they disseminate, which includes
167. Telephone interview with Char Beales, Vice-President for Media Services and Re-
search, National Council of Television Advertisers (Feb. 12, 1981).
168. See NAB TELEVISION CODE, supra note 36, §§ XIV-XV, at 18-23 (Advertising Stan-
dards). The NAB limitation of the supply of commercial time has been challenged by the
United States Department of Justice as an antitrust violation. United States v. National
Ass'n of Broadcasters, No. 79-1549 (D.D.C. filed June 14, 1979). For a discussion of the
economic effects of such restrictions, see FTC MEDIA POLICY BOOK, supra note 38 at 124-40;
and H. BEALES, TELEVISION PROGRAM QUALITY AND THE RESTRICTION ON THE NUMBER
OF COMMERCIALS (FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 30, June 1980).
169. See generally NAB TELEVISION CODE, supra note 36, § IX (Advertising Standards).
170. Cf American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), enforced as mod#/ed, 1980-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,569 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 1980), in which the FTC struck down the AMA's
near-total prohibition of advertising by physicians. Because self-regulation is permissible
under the rule of reason if it promotes competition, the FTC's decision in the AMA case
allowed that group to issue and enforce "reasonable ethical guidelines" to weed out false or
deceptive advertising by member physicians. 94 F.T.C. at 1037. See also Address by E. Perry
Johnson, Director of the FTC Bureau of Competition, 17th Annual Symposium on Trade
Association Law and Practice of the Antitrust Law Committee, Bar Association of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 25, 1981).
171. Beales Interview, supra note 167.
172. For a discussion of Prestel and similar videotex systems and their capabilities, see
Window on the World- The Home Information Revolution, Bus. WK., June 29, 1981, at 74.
See also R. WOOLFE, VIDEOTEX: THE NEW TELEVISION/TELEPHONE INFORMATION SERV-
ICES (1980).
173. FTC MEDIA POLICY BOOK, supra note 38, at 52.
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some advertisements.
1 74
While advertising is not regulated on Prestel, all information providers
are asked to sign a voluntary code of conduct, most of which is concerned
with advertising. 17' The basic principle, not surprisingly, is that the adver-
tising "must be legal, decent, honest and truthful."' 176 An advertisement
must be clearly distinguishable from adjacent data, and viewers must be
warned if they are to be charged for a "frame" (video page) of advertis-
ing. 177 As to the direct sale of merchandise via Prestel, the Code requires
not only delivery within twenty-eight days (or the customer must be given
a written notice of a right to cancel the order and obtain a refund), but also
a minimum fourteen day customer approval period. 178 If the goods do not
correspond to the description or if they are defective, the seller must pro-
vide a complete refund. 
7
1
Some of the more advanced cable systems, which offer interactive capac-
ity and opportunities for direct selling, have much in common with Prestel.
Because it is a common carrier medium, however, Prestel's code applies to
the information providers, not to the medium of distribution. In its present
state, cable appears to be a hybrid between a common carrier (with no
control over content) and a publisher (exercising total control over con-
tent). If a self-regulatory code were developed for cable, should only the
program suppliers (e.g., the cable satellite networks such as CNN and
ESPN) be bound? Only the advertisers? Or should the local system opera-
tors themselves be responsible for advertising? The cable operators do not
act as common carriers, but seek to control the mix of programs offered to
subscribers in order to maximize their revenues, thus providing a basis for
a share of responsibility for the commercial messages they choose to
carry.
180
As for the national cable programming networks, they are members of
NCTA and have representatives on the advertising committee. However,
no clearance procedure comparable to the broadcast network practice has
yet been established, on the theory that the commercials seen on cable are
174. Oracle Publishes Its First Rate Card, DIRECT MARKETING, Mar. 1981, at 126.
175. See ASSOCIATION OF VIEWDATA INFORMATION PROVIDERS, LTD., VIEWDATA
CODE OF PRACTICE (1980).
176. Id § 2, para. 2 (Advertising).
177. Id § 2, para. 3 (Advertising).
178. Id § 3, paras. 3.1 to 3.4 (Direct Sale of Goods and Services).
179. Id § 3, para. 3.7 (Direct Sale of Goods and Services).
180. At least one cable system, Gill Cable of San Jose, California, has a continuity ac-
ceptance department and uses the standards set forth in the NAB Code to screen commer-
cials. Statement of Robert Hosfeldt of Gill Cable, The Consumer and Cable Television: A
National Conference, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 27, 1981).
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no different from those on broadcast television which have already under-
gone network clearance. 8 ' If and when the advertising community starts
developing campaigns specifically for cable distribution, however, the role
of the cable networks in screening commercials could become as crucial as
broadcast network clearance is today. If the cable networks do not assume
this function, the work of self-regulatory bodies such as the NAD/NARB
will certainly be much more difficult.
As may be inferred from the preceding discussion, self-regulation of tel-
evision advertising has ebbed and flowed over the years, depending on the
political climate. Nevertheless, this process has produced benefits to the
public in the form of more accurate advertising, 8 2 which in turn can spur
competition in the marketplace. The cable industry has the opportunity to
prevent problems from arising that might otherwise require government
regulation. In the words of an Advertising Age editorial, "it would be fool-
hardy for business leaders to declare victory and go back to the old
ways." 1
83
IV. LOCAL CABLE FRANCHISING PROCESS-OPPORTUNITY FOR
CITIZENS TO WORK WITH INDUSTRY ON ADVERTISING AND
MARKETING ISSUES
4. Local Cable Franchising
Unlike broadcasters, cable operators are not granted licenses by the fed-
eral government but rather are franchised at the local level. At one time,
however, a cable system could not legally begin providing service without
first obtaining a certificate of compliance from the FCC. The prerequisite
for obtaining such a certificate was a local franchise granted to the appli-
cant in accordance with a set of procedures and guidelines imposed by the
FCC.' In the wake of the Supreme Court case overturning some of its
major cable television regulations,185 the FCC deleted the certificate of
compliance requirement in favor of the more permissive "signal registra-
tion," which need state little more than the applicant's name, address and
181. Telephone interview with Kay Koplovitz, President, USA Network (Feb. 13, 1981).
182. Cf Dowling, Information Content in U.S. andAustralian Television Advertising, 44 J.
OF MARKETING 34 (1980), in which the author concluded that Australian television com-
mercials were more informative than their United States counterparts, due in part to the
stronger enforcement procedures of Australian self-regulatory authorities. Id at 36-37.
183. Self Regulation and FTC's New Course, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 9, 1981, at 18.
184. 47 C.F.R. § 76.11 (1972).
185. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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a skeletal outline of the proposed cable service.' 86 Previously mandatory
FCC guidelines have been changed to recommendations (e.g., that a full
public hearing affording due process precede the grant of a franchise, a
fifteen year maximum term for franchise awards, and a requirement that
the franchise recipient establish procedures for investigating and resolving
subscriber complaints).1
87
The states have also exerted a limited amount of regulatory power over
cable television. The Supreme Court has upheld state regulation of cable
as a public utility because cable television is local in nature and does not
demand national uniformity. The Court further found that the FCC has
not preempted the field by regulating in the same subject areas as the states
(e.g., rates and quality of signal).' 8 Although forty-one states have en-
acted at least one statute applicable specifically to cable television, only
eleven states have adopted any form of cable regulation. 189 Massachu-
setts, 190 Minnesota, 191 and New York' 92 have set up independent cable
television commissions, but the actual franchising authority remains with
the local governments. Indeed, one of the major functions of the New
York State Commission on Cable Television is to advise municipalities on
the franchising process.) 93 Only in Alaska,'
94 Connecticut, 195 Hawaii, 196
Delaware, 97 Rhode Island,'98 and Vermont 199 does the state itself grant
186. 47 C.F.R. § 76.12 (1980).
187. 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1980). Only the limits on the franchise fee have been retained as
mandatory.
188. TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), af'd per curiam, 396 U.S.
556 (1970) (upholding the constitutionality of a Nevada statute granting regulatory authority
over cable television to the Nevada Public Service Commission). More recently, the Court
held that municipalities would not be exempt from antitrust actions if local restrictions on
competition in the cable area were not specifically authorized by the states. See Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144 (Jan. 13, 1982). But see Id. at
4149 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing whether federal antitrust laws should preempt
local ordinances).
189. FCC, CABLE TELEVISION STATE REGULATION-A SURVEY OF FRANCHISING AND
OTHER STATE LAW AND REGULATION ON CABLE TELEVISION 1 (1977). See generally, Briley,
State Involvement in Cable TV and Other Communications Services.- A Current Review, in 2
THE CABLE/BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK 35 (M. Hollowell ed. 1980).
190. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 166A, §§ 2 & 3 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981).
191. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 238.06 & 238.08 (West Supp. 1981).
192. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 814 & 819 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
193. See N.Y. STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE TELEVISION
FRANCHISING WORKBOOK (1980).
194. ALASKA STAT. §§ 42.05.141 & 42.05.701 (1976).
195. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-330 to -333 (West Supp. 1981).
196. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 440G-2 to -5 (1976).
197. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 201 (Supp. 1980). The Delaware Public Service Commis-
sion grants franchises only in unincorporated areas of the state.
198. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 391-93 & 391-96 (Supp. 1980).
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cable television franchises through the public utility or public service
commission.
In most cases, the municipality plays the leading role in regulating cable
television. The cable operator generally enters into a franchising agree-
ment with the local government. It is important to realize that a local cable
franchise is, above all else, a public franchise, i.e., a legal entity with a long
history of judicial interpretation. A cable franchise, like any public
franchise, is a privilege conferred by government on an individual or cor-
poration to do for the public benefit that which is not a common right of
citizens generally. 2°' The laying of cable in, on, and over public streets is a
privilege which, but for the grant of a franchise, would be a trespass.20'
In essence, a cable franchise is a contract between the grantor sovereign,
the local government, and the grantee, the cable operator.2°2 A franchise
offer, even when contained in a statute or ordinance, must be accepted and
acted upon to become effective. 2 3 Once accepted, the franchise is gener-
ally treated as any other contract, binding both parties to its terms and
tenor.2°4 A grantor sovereign can attach to a franchise any terms it sees fit,
and may attach any lawful conditions (which then become part of the con-
tract) to its exercise. 205 The only limitations on terms that may be attached
to a franchise are that the terms must be legal and not against public pol-
icy. 2°6 A cable franchise may thus include stipulations as to standards of
service to the community.
20 7
Indeed, a grantor sovereign can, by means of a voluntarily accepted
franchise, impose obligations upon a grantee which would be beyond the
199. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§ 502 & 503 (Supp. 1981).
200. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 669 (1885).
201. Cf. People ex rel Foley v. Begole, 56 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1936); People ex rel. Metro-
politan St. Ry. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 174 N.Y. 417, 67 N.E. 69 (1903), a i'd, 199 U.S.
1 (1905).
202. See Larson v. South Dakota, 278 U.S. 429 (1929).
203. Capital City Light & Fuel Co. v. Tallahassee, 186 U.S. 401, 409 (1902).
204. Grand Trunk W. Ry. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544 (1913); Louisville v. Cumberland
Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 U.S. 649 (1912). As a wise precaution, some franchise ordinances specif-
ically state that they are to be treated as contracts. See, e.g., 8 AM. JUR. LEGAL FoRMs 2D
Franchires from Public Entities § 124:71 (1972).
205. Southern Pac. Co. v. Portland, 227 U.S. 559 (1913).
206. Eg., Southern Pub. Util. Co. v. Charlotte, 179 N.C. 151, 101 S.E. 619 (1919); Chi-
cago Gen. Ry. v. Chicago, 176 Ill. 253, 52 N.E. 880 (1898). They also must not violate the
antitrust laws. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 50 U.S.L.W. 4144
(Jan. 13, 1982).
207. For sample language stipulating some standards of service for a cable television
franchise, see 8 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D Franchisesfrom Public Entities § 124:26 (1972)
(secs. 1 & 2).
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authority of the grantor, but for the grantee's voluntary acceptance.2 0 8
Such obligations attached to a cable television franchise were upheld in
Illinois Broadcasting Co. v. Decatur:
209
Decatur has the right to attach--but not impose or exact--condi-
tions to such use, though unrelated to it, leaving it up to the per-
son seeking the grant to either accept or reject them. Cast in this
mold the ordinance becomes effective only upon acceptance. Re-
jection, and the ordinance is a dead letter. We see nothing wrong
in the city saying in effect: You may use our streets for such and
such a purpose as such purpose is reasonable and in the public
interest yet before we will grant you this, you must in turn agree
to certain conditions collateral to the specific use you desire.
• . . [T]hese conditions are self-imposed. They are not imposed
by Decatur. If General [the cable franchisee] agrees to be so regu-
lated who can complain. If General accepts a condition to pay a
given sum who cares, and if General pays, as we assume it will,
who is hurt. If General discovers later on that some of the condi-
tions it agreed to are onerous, it can assuage itself with the
thought that surcease is but fifteen years away-a condition, too,
it agreed to.
210
Thus, a municipality can place conditions in the franchise agreement, such
as provisions for public access and privacy protections for consumers, that,
if accepted by the franchisee, would appear to be perfectly legal.
The public franchise differs from ordinary contracts in that the grantor
sovereign is not precluded from subsequently enacting legislation under its
police power that regulates the exercise of the franchise so long as it does
not interfere substantially with the main object of the franchise.21' A mu-
nicipality (grantor sovereign) can also specifically reserve the power to al-
ter the franchise by subsequent enactment.21 2 Thus, if all the ramifications
of the public interest concerning cable television are not apparent at the
time the initial franchise is granted, the municipality can retain some de-
gree of flexibility under public franchise law.
208. Southern Pac. Co. v. Portland, 227 U.S. 559 (1913).
209. 96 111. App. 2d 454, 238 N.E.2d 261 (1968).
210. Id at 461, 238 N.E.2d at 265.
211. Pearsall v. Great N. Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana
Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885). The grantor cannot, however, effectively annul the franchise
under the rubric of police power. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 236 (1904).
212. C. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board of Improvement of Paving, 274 U.S.
387, 390 (1927). For sample language specifically reserving the right to alter the terms of a
cable television franchise, see 8 AM. JuR. LEGAL FoRMs 2D Franchisesfrom Public Entities
§ 124:41 (1972).
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B. Consumer Protection Franchise Provisions
Although it is probably within the authority of every municipality that
has granted a cable franchise, there is currently no state law or local regu-
latory action directed at the responsibility of cable franchisees for advertis-
ing or marketing originating on cable channels. A few simple paragraphs
in the franchise agreement could establish this responsibility, while retain-
ing sufficient flexibility to account for future developments in the form of
advertising and marketing on cable, as well as developments in self-regula-
tion by the industry.
Just as the FCC's rather general requirements that local broadcast sta-
tions assume responsibility for screening out deceptive advertisements may
in part have led to the protective net of self-regulation of advertising that
exists in the broadcast community, so too the presence of local provisions
of this type could spur the development of clearance procedures by the
satellite-distributed cable networks. A local cable system that risks possible
litigation for deceptive commercials would no doubt refuse to distribute
advertiser-supported cable programs that did not feature some sort of
screening process for the featured commercials. Thus, a few well-placed
local restrictions could lead to a healthy level of self-regulation on a na-
tional scale by cable program suppliers. Such measures could benefit the
industry by increasing the credibility of cable television as an advertising
medium.
Many franchise agreements already require the operator to establish a
local office to handle complaints about reception, installation, or billing.
213
Should the cable company also be asked to use its local office to resolve
consumer complaints about late shipment, defective products, or improper
billing of products directly marketed on cable? Should a complaint han-
dling service for advertised items be required only if the cable company
does the billing for the marketer or receives a share of the revenue of items
sold? Could complaint handling be done more efficiently by pooling the
resources of cable systems at the regional level?2 14 Given that consumers
are being asked to purchase items sight unseen, should the cable system
require marketers who use their facilities to offer "satisfaction guaranteed"
213. The FCC now recommends establishment of such an office in the franchise agree-
ment. 47 C.F.R. § 76:31 note (1980). For sample franchise language, see 8 AM. JUR. LEGAL
FORMS 2D Franchisesfrom Public Entities § 124:27 (Supp. 1981) (art. 18).
214. A large portion of advertising on cable systems is sold through regional "intercon-
nects." Gay, The Cable Rep Entrepreneurs, MARKETING AND MEDIA DECISIONS, Feb. 1981,
at 72.
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or at least provide a warranty against defects? 215 At the very least, should
the cable system agree to keep records of the addresses and telephone
numbers of companies engaging in direct marketing, so that subscribers
will have a place to go with their complaints?
Given the somewhat uncertain aspects of the details of advertising and
marketing on cable television, the franchise agreement itself could contain
only a general provision regarding the cable operator's duties, with the
details to be developed over time by a citizens' advisory committee or the
local office of telecommunications. In this way, if self-regulation is work-
ing, there may be no need for more specific provisions. But it is important
at least to establish the basic principle of operator responsibility in the
franchise agreement because there may not be an equivalent opportunity
to raise the issue until the franchise is renewed some ten or fifteen years
later. Once the franchise has been granted, the local community may not
have the same bargaining power to win concessions from the cable com-
pany. Other issues could also be discussed with franchise applicants. In
the interest of assuring the free flow of nondeceptive commercial speech,
cable systems could be advised by the local government not to place any
unnecessary categorical restrictions on comparative, professional, or price
advertisements. The Supreme Court has struck down such advertising re-
strictions when imposed by the state itself or by professional
associations.21 6
Freely-negotiated prophylactic measures could prevent the use of cable
television for fraud or deception by inspiring the development of a self-
regulatory framework, with the least amount of government involvement.
The following language, while by no means foolproof, might be considered
to achieve this end:
FRANCHISEE assumes ultimate responsibility for eliminating
any false, deceptive or misleading commercial material from all
origination cablecasting material carried on the CABLE
SYSTEM.217
215. Marketers who use the British Prestel system have agreed to sell items "on ap-
proval" only. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
216. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding a bar association ban on
attorney advertising unconstitutional); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (striking down a state ban on price advertising
of prescription drugs on first amendment grounds).
217. FCC defines origination cablecasting as: "Programming (exclusive of broadcast sig-
nals) carried on a cable television system over one or more channels and subject to the
exclusive control of the cable operator." 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w) (1980). Presumably, the
franchise agreement would define it similarly. This definition would not include leased or
public access channels.
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FRANCHISEE'S responsibility is personal and may not be
delegated, but FRANCHISEE may rely on prior determinations
regarding false, misleading or deceptive content made by respon-
sible cable television industry 4etworks or organizations, respon-
sible federal regulatory agencies or [state and/or local equivalent
agencies].
FRANCHISEE shall provide facilities and personnel for re-
ceiving complaints from SUBSCRIBERS regarding products and
services advertised over the CABLE SYSTEM. FRANCHISEE
shall provide a complaining SUBSCRIBER with the true busi-
ness name, address and telephone number of the product or serv-
ice provider and, if requested by the SUBSCRIBER, refer the
complaint to an appropriate consumer aid organization. In addi-
tion, FRANCHISEE shall compile and retain for three years a
log of all such SUBSCRIBER complaints and shall consider any
such complaints in determining the acceptability of specific
advertisements.
Clearly, each locality would have to tailor the franchise language to suit
its needs. One would not want to ask the cable company to produce more
consumer protection than is realistic. After all, some systems envision over
100 channels of programming. Broadcast licensees must keep track of the
commercials on only one channel. Lack of cable operator control over
leased channels and public access channels suggests that these should be
excluded from the cable operator's responsibility. Yet, cable systems can
be selective about the programs they choose to fill their origination chan-
nels. They could demand that national cable networks screen their com-
mercials for possible deception. They could refuse to accept direct
marketers for local spots if they do not offer suitable warranties, or if they
have been subject to a high level of complaints concerning late shipment.
While cable companies may take on this task voluntarily, given the eco-
nomic realities of the marketplace, it is unlikely that they would do so
unless it proved necessary to secure the franchise. In the long run, how-
ever, responsible business practices may lead to a greater consumer accept-
ance of marketing via cable television as well as greater profits for the
industry.
C First Amendment Issues
Some local governments may hesitate to seek consumer protection pro-
visions because they might be challenged on constitutional grounds.2 18
218. See Cable More Akin to Newspapers than Broadcasters, NCTA Tells Senate, B ROAD-
CASTING, May 4, 1981, at 71, which quotes the NCTA: "Like newspaper publishers, cable
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Such fears are largely unfounded, however, due to the unique nature of the
cable medium and the quasi-contractual nature of the franchising process.
The first amendment protection of the press varies with the medium be-
ing used. The Supreme Court has stated that while "the basic principles of
freedom of speech and the press. . . do not vary," any one medium is not
"necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar
problems."2 9 The Court has also asserted that "differences in the charac-
teristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards
applied to them. ,220
The print medium enjoys the highest level of free press protection. The
constitutional doctrine prohibiting prior restraints originated with the writ-
ten press 22I and is still most forceful in that medium.222 While licensing is
commonly accepted for broadcasting, the licensing of a newspaper would
be a classic example of an impermissible prior restraint.223 A newspaper
may need certain licenses as adjuncts to its commercial operation (e.g.,
building permits and vendors' licenses) but cannot be saddled with a li-
cense requirement simply to publish, as a cable or broadcast system is to
transmit. Even adjunct licenses, if used to inhibit newspapers, may be im-
permissible restraints.224 In fact, the only major restriction on the free ex-
ercise of expression placed on the print media is a limited liability for
defamation.225
With regard to commercial advertising, some limited government re-
strictions have been permitted. For instance, a paper may be required to
remove sex designations from its "help wanted" classified advertise-
ments.226 In addition, many states have statutes (albeit, unenforced) which
hold the publisher responsible for knowingly disseminating false or fraud-
operators should be free of government attempts to tell them what must be said on, or who
must have access to, their medium of expression,"
219. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
220. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
221. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
222. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (U.S. government
could not enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing a classified
report officially entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy"
("The Pentagon Papers")).
223. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. at 713.
224. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
225. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
226. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973) (municipal ordinance prohibiting newspapers from carrying sex designations in ad-
vertisements for nonexempt job categories did not violate the publisher's first amendment
rights).
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ulent advertising.227
By contrast, a significant amount of regulation is permitted for the
broadcast media. While anyone is free to print and distribute written
materials, only a small fraction of those who would like to use broadcast
frequencies are able to do so without unduly interfering with the broad-
casts of others. To deal with this problem of electronic cacophony, Con-
gress established the Federal Radio Commission in 1927.228 The
Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal Communications Com-
mission, giving it the power to allocate frequencies to applicants to serve
"the public interest, convenience, or necessity." 229 The scarcity of broad-
cast frequencies was identified by the Supreme Court as the basis for re-
quiring access for competing viewpoints (i.e., the "fairness doctrine"), 23 ° a
restriction on the free expression of broadcasters that would be imper-
missible if applied to print publishers.23'
The Supreme Court has also cited the intrusiveness of the electronic me-
dia as a relevant distinction between print publishing and broadcasting for
first amendment analysis. Noting that "the broadcast media have estab-
lished a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans" and are
"uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read," the Court
upheld an FCC restriction against the broadcast of "indecent" material.232
In another case, the Court quoted Herbert Hoover's statement from his
days as Commerce Secretary that "the radio listener does not have the
same option that the reader of publications has-to ignore advertising in
which he is not interested .... 233
Cable television is not identical to print publishing for first amendment
purposes but instead has much in common with broadcasting. Anyone can
hand out leaflets or establish a newspaper or magazine without interfering
with the rights of others. On the other hand, before one can become a
cablecaster, a franchise to use the local rights-of-way must be obtained.
Cable television is a video medium equally as intrusive as broadcast tel-
evision. Both provide sound and moving pictures and have an identical
impact on the viewer. Indeed, when a cable system is hooked up to a tele-
227. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1122-23,
1152 (1967).
228. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934).
229. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
230. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-79 (1969); National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
231. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
232. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
233. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 128 (1973)
(upholding the right of broadcasters to refuse to accept paid editorial advertising).
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vision set, the typical subscriber foregoes all broadcast television and uses
the cable for both cable-originated programming and retransmission of
broadcast-originated programming. As far as the impact on the viewer is
concerned, the only significant difference between broadcast and cable tel-
evision is that the former is free, while the latter is only available through
paid subscription.
On the other hand, cable television lacks the same scarcity of available
frequencies as broadcasting. Current technology allows over fifty channels
to be transmitted over a single coaxial cable and, theoretically, any
number of cables can be installed at the same time. It is precisely this lack
of scarcity of outlets that is most commonly cited for the proposition that
first amendment principles applicable to cable television should be those
now applied to newspapers, which also lack scarcity, rather than those
principles applied to the broadcast media.234
While cable does not suffer from the same scarcity of frequencies prob-
lem that over-the-air broadcasting does, it is a limited access medium in
other ways. Many cable systems derive the bulk of their programming
from satellite-distributed networks. The satellites themselves have limited
available space, and the launching of communication satellites must be
authorized by the FCC.235 Thus, the distribution of cable programs is lim-
ited by the availability of satellite space.
In addition, the capital expenditures necessary to wire a city or town are
such that only one cable system is likely to be available in any given local-
ity.236 While exclusive franchises are rare and have been challenged le-
gally,237 in effect most cable franchise holders have a regional monopoly.
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled expressly on "economic scar-
city" (when the relevant market will not support more commercial users,
although the medium could physically withstand more), at least one court
has inferred from Supreme Court opinions that economic scarcity is not
sufficient to justify government regulation of the press.2 38 In this sense, the
234. E.g., Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation The FCC, the First Amendment
and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 133, 135 (1976).
235. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 25.390 (1980).
236. An attorney with the National Cable Television Association has stated: "In reality,
if one operator has 'built' a city, another cable operator isn't going to build another system."
Andrew, Courts Ponder Status of Cable TV to Rule on Legality of Regulation, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 29, 1980, at 11, col. 3 (quoting James Ewalt).
237. See California Judge Says Exclusive Franchises Are Unconstitutional, BROADCAST-
ING, Jan. 12, 1981, at 69. Governor Carey of New York has also proposed legislation aimed
at encouraging new cable companies to compete in areas where only one company is now
providing service. Carey Moves to Ease Controls on Cable TV, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 1981, at
81.
238. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). That court interpreted
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one-cable town is the same as the one-newspaper town.
Any first amendment analysis of the permissible limits of government
regulation must account not only for the nature of the medium but also for
the nature of the proposed restriction itself.239 The concept of cablecaster
responsibility for false or misleading advertising on the channels it controls
is far less of an intrusion on editorial prerogatives than are requirements to
set aside leased channels or to provide access to any and all speakers on a
first come-first served basis. The proposal discussed in this article would
affect only commercial speech, which is entitled to a lesser degree of pro-
tection than other forms of speech.24 Furthermore, the only type of speech
that might be suppressed, namely false or misleading advertising, is wholly
outside the first amendment's protection.24'
The constitutional status of commercial speech has undergone dramatic
change in recent years. The issue had remained dormant since the 1940's,
when Valentine v. Chrestensen24 2 suggested to nearly all courts and com-
mentators that "purely commercial advertising," whether deceptive or not,
was wholly without first amendment protection and could, therefore, be
freely regulated by the government.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-56 (1974), as indicating that
economic scarcity is "insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First
Amendment rights of the conventional press. . . and there is nothing in the record before us
to suggest a constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this
point." 567 F.2d at 46.
239. Cf. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 46. ("The absence in cable television
of the physical restraints of the electromagnetic spectrum does not, however, automatically
lead to the conclusion that no regulation of cable television is valid. . . . [Riules restricting
speech do not necessarily abridge freedom of speech.").
240. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Several commentators
have been critical of the Court's developing commercial speech doctrine, arguing that the
balancing approach is a return to "economic due process" because it fails to give appropriate
deference to state regulation of commercial activities. Eg., Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979). See also
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 588 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting). Others have criticized the extension of a lesser form of first amendment
protection to commercial speech because it may dilute the level of protection afforded other
forms of speech. Eg., Baker, Commercial Speech. A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976); Roberts, TowardA General Theory of Commercial Speech and the
FirstAmendment, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 115 (1979). Another commentator fears that the applica-
tion of a first amendment balancing test commercial speech may undercut the general free
speech principle of content neutrality. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment The-
ory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1979).
241. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 566 ("At
the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment.
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading.").
242. 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,243 first held un-
equivocally that speech that "does no more than propose a commercial
transaction" is entitled to some degree of first amendment free speech pro-
tection. Recognizing the interests of sellers, consumers, and society, the
Court emphasized that the "free flow of commercial information. . . is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise sys-
tem. .. ."244 Yet, from the outset, the Court recognized that there were
limits to the first amendment shield in the commercial area. The Court
alluded to the "commonsense differences" between commercial speech and
other varieties, namely, that its truth is more readily verified by the
speaker than other forms of speech, and that it is more durable and less
likely to be chilled by regulation because "advertising is the sine qua non of
commercial profits ... 45 Acknowledging the legitimate government
interest in regulating false, deceptive, or misleading advertising, the Court
stated that "[t]he First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not pro-
hibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information
flow cleanly as well as freely." 2 "
Given the Court's characterization of commercial speech, it is not sur-
prising that the permissible scope of regulation goes beyond the restriction
of misleading or deceptive speech to include broad, prophylactic measures
designed to prevent deception.247 Thus, the Court upheld a disciplinary
action against an Ohio lawyer for violating a rule against in-person solici-
tation, even though it was not alleged specifically that his conduct was
deceptive, because "the State has a legitimate and indeed 'compelling' in-
terest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue
influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious con-
duct.""'24 Similarly, the Court upheld a complete ban on the use of trade
names by optometrists because it concluded there was "a significant possi-
bility that trade names will be used to mislead the public." '' 9 In other
243. 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
244. Id at 765. For a discussion of the relationship of commercial speech to the market-
place of ideas theory of free speech, see Westen, The First Amendment: Barrier or Impetus to
FTC Advertising Remedies?, 46 BROOKLYN L. REv. 487 (1980).
245. 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
246. Id at 771-72.
247. For an economic and legal analysis of the appropriate scope of government regula-
tion to prevent deception in commercial speech, see Reich, Preventing Deception in Commer-
cial Speech, 54 N.Y.U.L. REv. 775 (1979).
248. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1980).
249. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). Some authors have characterized the
Friedman opinion as a dramatic shift away from the more demanding balancing test applied
to strike down state laws in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates. Eg., Comment, First Amendment
j
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words, the "government may ban forms of communication more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it .... 250
The Court has recently clarified the test for government regulation of
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission,2s  a case involving a state regulation prohibiting a utility
from advertising to promote the use of electricity. The majority opinion
stated that a "four-part analysis" has developed for commercial speech
cases. First, a court must determine whether the expression comes within
the first amendment's purview at all. For commercial speech, that means
commercial speech "at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. 25 2 Second, the government must assert a "substantial interest" to
be accomplished by the regulation.253 Third, the restriction must "directly
advance" the substantial state interest.25 4 Fourth, the reviewing court must
determine whether the restriction "is not more extensive than is neces-
sary. ' 25' For the purpose of local regulation of false or misleading com-
mercial speech on cable television, stopping at the first inquiry is
appropriate. Such commercial speech is utterly without first amendment
protection and may be prohibited by government regulation.
The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with the issue of the legal responsi-
bility of the publisher of deceptive advertising, as opposed to the responsi-
bility of the advertiser himself. By analogy, however, cases holding
publishers liable for defamation do not distinguish between liability for
material originating with the publisher and material submitted by others,
including advertisements.256 Clearly publishers, and even broadcasters,
Protectionfor Commercial Speech.An OpticalIllusion?, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 799 (1979); Note,
Reuniting Commercial Speech and Due Process Analysis: The Standard/or Deceptiveness in
Friedman v. Rogers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1456 (1979).
250. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 563.
251. 477 U.S. 557 (1980).
252. Id at 566.
253. Id at 564.
254. Id at 566.
255. Id The New York regulation banning all promotional advertising by electric utili-
ties was held invalid because the Public Service Commission failed to show that less restric-
tive methods would not achieve its admittedly substantial interest in energy conservation. It
is not clear that this "least restrictive means" test would apply to restrictions aimed at mis-
leading or deceptive speech because such expression is apparently considered by the Court
to be outside the scope of the first amendment. Also, in an earlier case in which a state
banned all trade names for optometrists because they were potentially deceptive, the Court
said that "there is no First Amendment rule ...requiring a State to allow deceptive or
misleading commercial speech whenever the publication of additional information can clar-
ify or offset the effects of the spurious communication." Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12
n.lI (1978).
256. See Louisville Times Co. v. Lyttle, 257 Ky. 132, 77 S.W.2d 432 (1934); Kulesza v.
Alliance Printers & Publishers Inc., 318 Ill. App. 231, 47 N.E.2d 547 (1943); Fitch v. Daily
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have the freedom to accept or reject paid commercial messages, 257 so that
some reasonable duty of care with regard to false or deceptive advertise-
ments is well within the accepted scope of editorial control. This responsi-
bility should not have a chilling effect on the dissemination of truthful
commercial speech on cable television, nor should it unduly burden the
protected journalistic functions of disseminating news, information and
entertainment, because the cablecaster as well as the advertiser stands to
gain revenues through the distribution of advertising.
The conclusion that cablecaster responsibility for false or misleading ad-
vertising would be constitutional becomes even more forceful when it is
recalled that the municipality would not be simply regulating the local
cable system, but would in effect be conditioning a privilege on the accept-
ance of some degree of responsibility for its use. It is beyond question that
a municipality could prohibit altogether a private company from wiring its
streets unless state law dictated otherwise. Since such wiring is not a right,
a municipality could reasonably condition the grant of the privilege on the
acceptance of certain conditions. The conditions which may be imposed,
however, are not without limit. The Supreme Court has stated:
[A]s a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege
altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to im-
pose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited;
and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions
which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.258
Since it is difficult to argue that the dissemination of deceptive commercial
speech is a constitutional right, however, this doctrine should not pose a
significant problem.
The Supreme Court has held that surrender of substantial first amend-
ment rights (indeed, the imposition of a clear prior restraint) is not a viola-
tion of public policy when such a surrender is part of a voluntary
agreement. This would be the case in a cable franchise agreement. In the
News Pub. Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947 (1974). Several FTC cases have included the
advertising agency as well as the advertiser in actions against deceptive commercial
messages. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406 (1980). But see New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964), in which the Supreme Court noted that noncom-
mercial speech does not lose its protection (and the publisher cannot be held liable) solely
because it is published as a paid "editorial" advertisement.
257. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
258. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94
(1926). The continuing validity of Frost has been questioned. Geophysical Corp. of Alaska
v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 361, 371 n.2 (D. Alaska 1978). Moreover, its literal application
appears to contravene the subsequently enacted Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-609 (1976) (conditioning the privilege of a broadcast license on acceptance of restric-
tions of first amendment rights in its use).
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recent case of Snepp v. United States,259 the Court concluded that the CIA
may require, in an employment contract, the submission of any writings
(even if conceded to contain no classified material) for prepublication re-
view. Just as a cable applicant can refuse conditions, the prospective em-
ployee in the Snepp case could have refused to agree to the condition and
thus sacrificed government employment.2" If a voluntary agreement to a
prior restraint on free expression is not against public policy, it seems safe
to conclude that a voluntary agreement to avoid the dissemination of false
or misleading advertising (not protected by the first amendment) would
not be proscribed.
In summary, the local franchising process provides an opportunity to
negotiate with prospective cable operators regarding the public's interest in
preventing the dissemination of deceptive advertisements or abusive mar-
keting schemes on cable television. First amendment considerations, while
not to be taken lightly, should not preclude a cable company from agree-
ing to accept responsibility for commercial messages in return for the grant
of the franchise. Only unprotected speech, i.e., false or misleading adver-
tising, would be affected. Further, because commercial speech is readily
verifiable and peculiarly hardy, reasonable measures to preclude the use of
cable for deceptive advertisements should neither chill the flow of truthful
commercials nor reduce the cablecaster's economic base.
V. CONCLUSION
Cable television is on the verge of maturing as a conduit for commercial
messages and original program services. Thus far, no blemish has been
discovered to mar cable's image as a bonanza of information and en-
tertainment. Yet some instruction can be gleaned from examining typical
consumer problems, such as deceptive advertising and unfair marketing
practices, along with the government and industry regulatory framework
that has kept such practices in check in the traditional media.
The pressure of FCC regulation and threats of greater government in-
volvement appear to have played a role in the development of self-regula-
tion of advertising in broadcasting. Yet the FCC's jurisdiction to extend
similar restrictions to cable television is uncertain. Furthermore, it would
be inappropriate to apply industry-wide federal requirements for cable tel-
evision advertising unless a record of widespread consumer injury had de-
veloped. Similarly, the extension of FTC provisions regarding cooling-off
259. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
260. q., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1063 (1972).
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periods and late shipment for home sales should be approached with cau-
tion lest a promising new medium for commerce be strangled by the pre-
mature imposition of unnecessary restrictions.
Responsible self-regulation, with input from citizens and government,
could be the most cost-effective means of preventing consumer injury as
well as maintaining cable television's credibility with its viewers. The local
franchising process offers an opportunity for citizens and industry to nego-
tiate acceptable measures to deal with consumer protection issues in a co-
operative, rather than an adversarial, setting. This type of low-key, flexible
experimentation at the local level could serve to bolster the resolve of the
industry to police itself. By acting now, consumer injury could be avoided
and the necessity for burdensome litigation and unwieldy adminstrative
procedures foregone. As the decade of cable television unfolds, let us hope
that a spirit of fair play will prevail.

